

# *Studies in Intelligence*

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(December 2010)

**The Intelligence-Policy Nexus: Synthesizing with  
Clients, Not Analyzing for Customers**

**A New President, a Better CIA, and an Old War:  
Eisenhower and Intelligence Reporting on Korea,  
1953**

**Reviews:**

*The International Politics of Intelligence Sharing*

*SIX: A History of Britain's Secret Intelligence Service—Part 1: Murder and Mayhem, 1909–1939*

*Changgom [Long Sword]*

*Stalin's Romeo Spy*

**The Intelligence Officer's Bookshelf**



Center for the Study of Intelligence

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
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## Synthesizing with Clients, Not Analyzing for Customers

*Josh Kerbel and Anthony Olcott*

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**“**  
*What if the Intelligence Community were to reimagine itself as a service-provider geared to engaging in goal-focused conversation as a well-defined regular activity? What, in other words, would happen if the IC were to become a provider of knowledge services, rather than a producer of information?*  
**”**

### ***What is the Proper Distance Between Analysts and Policymakers?***

Histories of the early stages of the modern Intelligence Community (IC) concur that by the start of the Cold War, most senior policymakers wanted more information to support their strategies and so tinkered with ways to configure an IC supportive of those efforts. There is no suggestion, however, that they were ever concerned about analysts somehow getting too close to them, and so usurping their policymaking prerogatives. The fear that analysis might be tainted or compromised by proximity to the policy process seems to have come entirely from the analytical community, which struggled from the beginning to keep itself at arm's length from policymakers.

Even though analytic units have begun in recent years to lean closer to policymakers by offering “opportunity analysis” and by sending analysts into National Security Council sup-

port jobs, the idea that a fire-wall between analysts and policymakers is needed remains an IC shibboleth.

For example, the homepage of the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence on CIA's public Web site says that its analysts “help provide timely, accurate, and *objective* [emphasis added] all-source intelligence analysis...[to] senior policymakers,” and it further points out that “While the CIA does not make foreign policy, our analysis of intelligence on overseas developments feeds into the informed decisions by policymakers and other senior decisionmakers in the national security and defense arenas.”<sup>1</sup>

The reasons for maintaining this “objectivity” were best articulated by Sherman Kent, the founder of CIA's analytic tradition, but the assumptions on which he based his insistence on a firewall go back at least to the beginning of the 20th century. In his 1949 book *Strategic Analysis for American World Policy*<sup>2</sup> Kent endorsed a position advanced a

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*The endnotes are available in the digital version of this article in [www.cia.gov](http://www.cia.gov).*

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*In Walter Lippmann's words, "The only institutional safeguard is to separate, as absolutely as it is possible to do so, the staff which executes from the staff which investigates."*

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quarter century earlier by Walter Lippmann, who had argued in *Public Opinion* that “every democrat feels in his bones that dangerous crises are incompatible with democracy, because the inertia of the masses is such that a very few must act quickly.”<sup>3</sup>

Fearing that the newly discovered entity of “public opinion” would inhibit the “very few”—policymakers like President Woodrow Wilson, for whom Lippmann had been a staffer—because of what he called “plebiscite autocracy or government by newspapers,”<sup>4</sup> Lippmann argued that the only way to ensure “impartial and objective analysis” (Kent’s term<sup>5</sup>) was to create what Lippmann termed “intelligence officials” who would be “independent both of the congressional committees dealing with that department and of the secretary at the head of it” so that “they should not be entangled either in decision or in action.”

Thus, in Lippmann’s words, “The only institutional safeguard is to separate, as absolutely as it is possible to do so, the staff which executes from the staff which investigates.”<sup>6</sup> The alternative, Kent later warned ominously, would be what he called “captured intelligence” or, even more ominously because the term came from the Nazi lexicon, *kümpfende Wissenschaft*, which Kent trans-

lated as “knowledge to further aims of state policy.”<sup>7</sup>

The problem with this system, however, is that if analysts keep themselves too far apart from policymakers, they have no way of knowing whether the policymakers want, need, or even use the “objective analysis” they churn out—a problem Kent himself recognized. In a 1948 letter to CIA director Admiral Roscoe Hillenkoetter about the function of the Office of Reports and Estimates (ORE), Kent warned, “Since [ORE] has no direct policy, planning, or operating consumer to service within its own organization...it is likely to suffer...from a want of close, confidential, and friendly guidance.” He offered the following solution.

*ORE should be brought into closest and most direct contact with consumers such as the National Security Council...having an ORE officer represent CIA (or participate in CIA's representation) at NSC staff discussions would have two great benefits: (a) It would assure ORE of knowing the precise nature of the consumer's requirements; and (b) it would enable ORE to convey to the consumer the precise dimensions of its [ORE's] capabilities. It is to be noted that these two matters interlock: when the consumer knows ORE's capabilities, he may change the*

*dimensions of this requirement (add to it, lessen it, or reorient it), and, when ORE knows the precise dimensions of the requirement, it may deploy its resources in such a fashion as to enlarge its capabilities. So long as liaison between consumer and ORE is maintained by someone not possessed of the highest professional competence in matters of substance and firsthand knowledge of ORE's resources, that liaison is almost certain to be inadequate for the purposes of both ORE and the consumer.<sup>8</sup>*

Closely linking analytic components with their immediate customers was not a new idea even then. Assistant Secretary of State Donald Russell had tried something very similar a few years before Kent’s letter, when he attempted to realize the recommendation of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)—a participant in the discussion about the nature of postwar national intelligence—that “the principal intelligence operations of the Government should be organized at the point where decision is made or action taken, i.e., at the departmental, or lower, level and not within any single central agency.”<sup>9</sup>

The so-called Russell Plan, however, was never implemented in any meaningful way, in part perhaps, because it had been undercut from the beginning by an interdepartmental Advisory Board on Intelligence chaired by Sherman Kent.<sup>10</sup> Whatever the reason, Russell’s

warning, that “the policy recommendations of a research unit which is not organizationally integrated with operations are very likely to be theoretical judgments with little basis in reality,” was largely forgotten over the decades to come.<sup>11</sup>

### **Tactics, Not Strategy**

The emergence of the Soviet Union as the West’s main opponent obscured a major part of Russell’s warning, which specifically concerned strategic policymaking. The kind of analytic support that Kent envisioned—analysts standing behind policymakers “with the book opened at the right page, to call their attention to the stubborn fact they may neglect”<sup>12</sup>—almost inevitably drives analytic support toward tactical intelligence, rather than the strategic, but it worked well for the IC’s Cold War glory years, because the nature of the Soviet Union and the means to face it were such that tactics all but merged with strategy.<sup>a13</sup>

Periodically, however, “objective analysis” came under fire for failure properly to serve the nation’s strategic policy goals. In 1966, for example, a CIA Inspector General’s study—usu-

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*The kind of analytic support that Kent envisioned—analysts standing behind policymakers “with the book opened at the right page, to call their attention to the stubborn fact they may neglect”—worked well for the IC’s Cold War glory years.*

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ally referred to as the Cunningham Report<sup>14</sup>—done in response to criticism that the IC had failed to “adequately consider the broader question of the slowly developing Sino-Soviet dispute” concluded the CIA was collecting “too much information and that, failing to get important information, it was flooding the system with secondary material,” thus “degrading production, making recognition of significant information more difficult in the mass of the trivial.” The reason for this excessive collection, the Cunningham Report charged, was that “there was no definition of what the government really needed from intelligence, so the community operated on its own assumptions, which tended to cover everything, just in case.”

Five years later, in 1971, the Schlesinger Report, prepared when James Schlesinger was at OMB, worried that “the impressive rise in [the] size and cost” of IC operations had not been met by “a commensurate improvement in the scope and overall quality of intelligence products.”<sup>15</sup> The reason for this, just as in 1966, was that

*the consumer frequently fails to specify his product needs for the producer; the producer, uncertain about eventual demands, encourages the collector to provide data without*

*selectivity or priority; and the collector emphasizes quantity rather than quality.*

In 1976 the Church Committee repeated the Cunningham and Schlesinger charges that “collection guides production rather than vice-versa.” As before, the reason for this “glut of paper” was that

*evaluation of the intelligence product by the consumers themselves is virtually non-existent.... Rarely, if ever, do high officials take the time to review the product carefully with the analysts and explain to them how the product could be improved and made more useful to the policymakers. The intelligence community, then, by default, evaluates its own performance without the benefit of any real feedback.<sup>16</sup>*

The same criticisms surfaced again in 1996 in the report of the Aspin-Brown Commission, “The Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community.” The commission had been convened in part out of concern about the continued cost of the IC, and in part to discuss what the nation’s intelligence needs were after the Cold War had ended.

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<sup>a</sup> The deep granularity of IC analysis of the USSR is vividly conveyed by the list of declassified products which is maintained by the Federation of American Scientists—these include such “strategic” products as *Strategic Value of Construction and Road-Building Machinery to the Soviet Orbit* (13 June 1951), *Soviet Strategic Weapons: Background for SALT* (1 November 1969), and *Implications of the 1975 Soviet Harvest* (17 March 1976).

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*The Aspin-Brown report then returned to the analyst-policymaker issue, saying that “intelligence producers need to build more direct relationships with their customers....”*

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Two of the commission's six major recommendations concerned the analyst-policymaker firewall. Making a point quite like the one Kent had tried to make to Hillenkoetter, the commission's first recommendation was that

*intelligence must be closer to those it serves. Intelligence agencies need better direction from the policy level, regarding both the roles they perform and what they collect and analyze. Policymakers need to appreciate to a greater extent what intelligence can offer them and be more involved in how intelligence capabilities are used.*

After recommending measures to increase IC intra-community information sharing and more efficient, less costly production, the Aspin-Brown Report then returned to the analyst-policymaker issue:

*Intelligence producers need to build more direct relationships with their customers, take greater advantage of expertise and capabilities outside the government, and take additional measures to improve the quality and timeliness of their output.<sup>17</sup>*

### ***Do Policymakers Care About a Firewall?***

Although separated by decades, all of the above mentioned reports describe essentially the same phenomenon: the persistent metric for the IC is output, not utility. Ironically, the system resembles a production process in a Soviet-style planned economy, where higher-order management determines production quotas for what *ought* to be manufactured, without regard for whether the end-users really want or need what is coming out of the production cycle. Kent and his colleagues may have called their end-users “consumers,” just as the IC tends today to call them “customers,” but it is a telling omission that virtually no IC product delivery system has an easy way to check “sales.” The percentage of products actually used, by how many people, of what rank, and for what purpose, is a closely guarded secret in most analytic shops, if that information is even collected at all.

This is not to say that the output of this system has no value to the end-users, but it does mean that it is more by luck than design that a product proves to be useful to a consumer. Although the Schlesinger, Church, and Aspin-Brown Reports all worried about the financial impact of what Schlesinger called the “gross redundancies” of the

existing system, the present system continues to flourish because it costs the policymakers nothing. Just as the Church Committee noted that “consumers tend to treat the intelligence product as a free good [so that] instead of articulating priorities, they demand information about everything,”<sup>18</sup> so did Mark Lowenthal, who served as a senior officer in the National Intelligence Council, characterize IC products 30 years later as “cost-free [newspaper] subscriptions that were never ordered and never have to be paid for, perks of the job.”<sup>19</sup>

This does not mean, however, that policymakers will continue to be content with the present “hit-or-miss” system forever. The information provided to policymakers may be free to use, but it is far from free to collect, process, and analyze, a fact which ought to place front and center the question of what precisely is the “value-added” the IC provides in the policymaking process.<sup>a</sup> The USSR and its allies were exactly the kind of linear, static, and very *complicated* entities against which Kent-style analysis could operate well—“analysis” coming from the Greek *analyein*, meaning “to break down” or “reduce.”<sup>20</sup>

Because it is only possible to break down events that have

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<sup>a</sup> It is worth remembering here that both the Russell Plan and the Schlesinger Report were driven by OMB concerns about the *cost* of intelligence, rather than its efficacy. Aspin-Brown too was largely a cost-driven exercise.

already happened or objects that already exist, analysis is by its nature devoted to understanding the past. As has already been noted, breaking down processes and events for policymakers worked when the adversary was the USSR, because the same drivers, motivations, and causes would presumably be in play the next time the Soviet system tried to do something, and the only source for such analysis was the information, usually secret, provided by the IC.

We are not the first to point out that the world that policymakers and analysts now face is not so much complicated as it is *complex*. The complex world is not Newtonian but more resembles that described by quantum physics. As Heraclitus famously argued, today's river may look like the river of yesterday, but it is not; rather, it is a different river every time we enter it. The past two decades are teaching us the power of networks, showing us how events can cascade and feedback loops can amplify effects that we did not see coming or dampen ones that we predicted were inevitable.<sup>21</sup>

The wars we face are increasingly asymmetrical, fought over causes that can seem incomprehensible to those for whom we fight, with results in which "victory" can look much more like "defeat," or vice versa.<sup>a</sup> Low-

<sup>a</sup> By way of illustration, who may be said to have "won" the Israel-Hezbollah conflict of 2006, the Russia-Georgia conflict of 2008, or the Israel-Hamas conflict of 2008-09?

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*The past two decades are teaching us the power of networks, showing us how events can cascade, and feedback loops can amplify effects that we did not see coming or dampen ones that we predicted were inevitable.*

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probability-high-impact "black swan" events are no longer the stuff of theory, and it grows ever more difficult to define who precisely is "the enemy."<sup>22</sup> In fact, for some of the issues the IC is beginning to take on as part of the security portfolio, e.g., global warming or pandemics, we may be the "enemies."

The complex world is not one in which policymakers need "more information." Forty-four years ago they may have complained of an "information explosion,"<sup>23</sup> but that was not yet a world in which humans create the equivalent of the contents of the Library of Congress *every 15 minutes*,<sup>24</sup> where flying drones are able to collect so much video and other sensory information that it would take 24 days to process what is captured in a single day,<sup>25</sup> where Google *for free* offers a cache of more than 1 trillion fully searchable sites<sup>26</sup>—a number that itself is reckoned to be only a tiny fraction of what it is possible to find in the so-called deep Web, which search engine spiders cannot index.<sup>27</sup>

### **What Do Policymakers Want?**

Policymakers require information as much as ever, but the IC is no longer the exclusive, or even a privileged, provider. Writing recently in these pages about his experience in support-

ing policymakers on the Afghan team at the NSC, Paul Miller characterized many IC products as "irrelevant and wasted" because, though "highly polished," they often compete poorly against other information sources on which the policymakers may draw, which can include "an undergraduate professor of political science, personal experience, [and] the headlines of the *New York Times*".<sup>28</sup>

What the policymakers he saw wanted, Miller wrote, was "the ability to reach out for basic fact-checking, rapid analysis, and short 'gut-check' pieces." While Miller saw some pieces in his time at the NSC that "approach[ed] the line of recommending policy," he

*never heard a White House official complain that intelligence had crossed the line. If anything, White House officials tended to want more of such analysis from the community, not less.*

Miller's experience sounds very like that reported by Thomas Fingar, in a speech he gave after he had retired as deputy director of national intelligence for analysis:

*[I remember] an exchange I had with Secretary Albright after I had*

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*Miller and Fingar make clear that at least some senior policymakers welcome opportunities to talk situations through with analysts.*

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*briefed her on new information regarding a country in the Middle East. When I finished, and after she had asked a few factual and analytic questions, she said, "What should I do about this?" I replied, "Madame Secretary, I'm an analyst; you know I don't do policy." She said, "Right, and I don't do analysis. Now, what should I do?" I demurred a second time, saying that I didn't think I knew enough about her objectives and the broader policy context to provide an informed answer. Her response: "Tom, I asked your opinion because I respect your judgment. That doesn't mean that I am going to do what you suggest, but I do want to know what you think." In response, I framed the problem as I thought it should be considered and suggested a course of action to deal with the problem.<sup>29</sup>*

Although Secretary Albright's request discomfited him, Fingar was able to do as she wished. This may have been because at the time Fingar worked in State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR). Officers in INR work comparatively closely with a small set of senior policymakers on policy issues that are reasonably well-known in

the organization. While Fingar claimed not to know the secretary's objectives as well as he would have liked, he was able to offer not only information, but also judgments about what "new information" might mean and the possible effects on a given policy. This is very like what Miller argues the NSC White House staff welcomes in analytic products that highlight courses of action, flag potential pitfalls, or that "draw attention to historically analogous situations in current challenges."<sup>30</sup> Miller and Fingar make clear that at least some senior policymakers welcome opportunities to talk situations through with analysts.

The experiences of Miller and Fingar also highlight another aspect of such exchanges that we argue is of enormous value—they could be kept secret. Since the IC's inception, it has been obsessed with *getting* secrets, to the extent that many people, especially within the IC, argue that intelligence *is* "secrets." There is strong evidence, however, that many policymakers do not necessarily want or need the secrets the IC offers them, and that an obsession with paying attention *only* to secrets may blind analysts to obvious things that are out in the open. Part of the culture of *getting* secrets though is that the IC also has a well-developed culture of *keeping* secrets. Though this may be incidental to the IC's original purpose, its

capacity to keep secrets is arguably among the most important "value-addeds" it might offer policymakers.

Of course the IC has a great deal more for policymakers than its secret-keeping culture. The IC also has thousands of skilled people who have thought long and hard about all sorts of issues, trying to figure out why things have happened and what might happen next. They care about our country, its safety, and its success. They are smart, articulate, and resourceful. Add secret-keeping to that mix and it is plain to see that the IC is uniquely qualified to provide policymakers with precisely what Secretary Albright indicated that she lacked, a secure "sounding chamber" in which she could share the burden of transforming information into policy with someone who could offer insights about the costs and benefits of various policy paths—and who would not talk about it.

### ***The IC as a Knowledge Service and Policymakers as its Clients***

That being the case, what would happen if the IC were to accept that it can no longer continue to collect secrets simply because they are interesting and to accept that policymakers are going to continue to make policy whether or not they use the Community's "highly polished products?" What if instead the IC were to reimagine itself as a service-provider geared to engaging in precisely the kind of goal-

focused conversation that Secretary Albright initiated with Fingar, now, however, not on an *ad hoc* and uncomfortable basis, but rather as a well-defined regular activity? What, in other words, would happen if the IC were to become a provider of *knowledge services*, rather than a producer of information?

For policymakers, the benefits of the change would probably be immediate, and comparatively large. In addition to having more straight-forward benefit from the kind of expertise and insight that Fingar possessed and Albright tapped, policymakers would gain the use of the entire IC as a “sounding room” for the policies they might be contemplating. Here they could explore policy ideas, tap into the expertise of the IC about possible consequences of a policy—potential downsides and unanticipated benefits.

Instead of offering ideas coyly through “opportunity analysis,” IC officers and their analysts could engage in straightforward consultations. Policymakers could send up “trial balloons” privately without having to fear, as they now do, that words intended for one audience will be instantly available elsewhere, with undesired effects. They would also have the benefit of being able to iterate and refine policies as they advance while the IC helped to observe and judge whether or not progress was being made toward a policy’s goal.

To be sure, this would require adjustment for policymakers.

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*What would happen if the IC were to accept...that policymakers are going to continue to make policy whether or not they use the community’s “highly polished products?”*

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Just as the IC would have to grow comfortable with making policy recommendations, so would policymakers have to get used to asking questions about something more than “data nuggets.” Indeed, a knowledge service-client system would require more than what Albright and Fingar achieved in that moment, which does not seem to have contained the real feedback the Church Committee Report had called for in 1976.<sup>a</sup>

This new relationship would require a continuing *conversation*. In a true client relationship, policymakers would have to get accustomed to having analysts question them, at least for the purpose of better understanding what question it is the policymaker is really seeking to answer. A model for this conversation might be the “reference interview” for which librarians are trained, in order to help patrons understand more precisely what their own information needs are—which, as one Web site puts it, “may turn out to be different than the reference question as initially

posed.”<sup>31</sup> At present, analyst-policymaker exchanges are one-way, a kind of call-response that will not do much to help policymakers sharpen their questions, particularly if the IC’s response is only that “we have no information on that.”

Policymakers do face very real possible costs in moving from the present system to one in which they and analysts share in shaping policy. In such a world it would no longer be possible to divide events into “policy successes” and “intelligence failures.” This increased responsibility has another consequence, policymakers would have to formulate their goals more precisely. The present system, particularly at the highest strategic level, too easily permits formulation of goals that, while desirable, are so nebulous that there is no way to tell whether progress is being made toward them. Just as a financial services provider might help a client whose initial stated goal is to become rich redefine that aim into something more specific—a retirement fund of \$n million by a certain age—so might IC “client advisers” help policymakers articulate more specific policy goals, rather than “good-to-have” desired end states like “democracy” or “freedom.”<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>a</sup> To be fair, the feedback that the Church Committee wanted seems both unrealistic—what policymaker would ever take the time *after* an event to, in effect, “grade” the analysis he or she had received?—and of little value in anything other than a mechanistic, linear world, rather like the many after-action reviews that concern themselves only with whether or not proper tradecraft was practiced, not whether the analysis was of use.

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*What is most needed in the client-service system is imagination not ingenuity in collection.*

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### **What Client Service Might Mean to IC Analysts**

The change for analysts, and the IC, would be more dramatic than it would be for policymakers. The biggest will be that the IC's default response to criticism in the present collection-centric system—typically enlarged collection efforts based on the presumption that additional data collection, rather than improved analysis, will provide answers<sup>33</sup>—will be obsolete. It will no longer be enough to say that the IC has done its best to obtain more secrets or other kinds of information.<sup>34</sup> In the new “service-centric” model, the IC's responsibility will be to *make hypotheses of meaning* about information that it does have. Sometimes more information might help, but usually *understanding* of information will be required, not more collection. What is most needed in this system is *imagination* not *ingenuity* in collection.

The differences between the two systems are precisely those that exist between “puzzles and mysteries,” Gregory Treverton’s famous analogy about the challenges of intelligence. Malcolm Gladwell, in his *New Yorker* article about Enron’s collapse highlighted the same differences as being those between “transmitter-” and “receiver-dependent” models of understanding.<sup>35</sup>

Both Treverton and Gladwell distinguish between *informa-*

*tion problems*, which for resolution require more data, access to which is controlled by an opponent or other entity, and *understanding problems*, those for which problem solvers already have enough information but which require perception, imagination, or cognition for understanding.

The fact that those grappling with problems of understanding can never be certain whether their jobs are done is only part of the burden in the client-service relationship. For them, the issue is not whether information is “objectively true” but whether the *way* in which information has been used has value; as a result the solver’s intellectual burden shifts from *trusting data* to trusting the *service provider*. In other words, client service depends upon the creation and maintenance of *trust*, rather than the intrinsic value of any particular piece of information, the particular platform, or the clandestine asset that produced it.<sup>a</sup>

Thus, in a client relationship, the client places trust not in

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<sup>a</sup> Even Sherman Kent appears to have recognized this, for one of the odder passages in his *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy* seeks to exculpate analysts who make mistakes by arguing that no one would fire “the dentist who pulls out the wrong tooth” or “the lawyer who loses a case.” (Kent, 194.) While it is difficult to imagine anyone retaining such an incompetent dentist, it is much easier to agree with Kent that one might indeed keep a lawyer who had lost a case—*provided one continued to trust the lawyer*.

analytical products or collection platforms but in a provider’s ability to place data in context, to understand how actions, events, and actors might all intersect and interact to affect outcomes. One need only look to the havoc wreaked by the sudden explosion of Iceland’s Eyjafjallajökull volcano to remember that events can be discontinuous as well as linear. What is important in a client relationship is not whether the volcano’s eruption was predicted, but how well the client and the “service team” adjusted to the new circumstances while still helping the client move toward desired goals and destinations. This process would include deciding with the client how new circumstances might have changed the goal, the costs that achieving the goal might now incur, or the pace at which it might proceed—all characteristics of working in complex systems, where every action changes the circumstances and outcomes. In this circumstance, the client who trusts the service team that didn’t forecast a volcano will remain a client. Conversely, as DCI Richard Helms once said, “No power has yet been found to force presidents of the United States to pay attention on a continuing basis to people and papers when confidence has been lost in the originator.”<sup>36</sup>

### **Enter the “Synthesist”**

It should be stressed that this new model of client service would not do away with the need for the skills and information necessary to make

informed hypotheses of causality about past events. Unlike the present system, however, where the analysis, the “break down,” of what has already happened is the endpoint of the process, in a client-service model this work would provide the foundation on which policy proposals would be based. Analysis would thus provide the elements that could be combined in imaginative ways to create something new, a process the Greeks saw as the antithesis of analysis, or *synthesis*.

What might a client-service relationship require of today's intelligence synthesists if they are to develop and maintain their clients' trust?

- Stovepiping of information or knowledge would no longer be possible, as client service would require analysts not only to have expertise but to know how to find and engage other experts.
- Analysts could no longer depend solely upon what collectors had fed their inboxes.
- Analysts would have to look beyond their particular “account” and would have to be able to work with others to see how information meshes, and how further information might change a picture.
- The Intelligence Community would have to abandon its present taboo on analysts factoring the effects of US actions or policies into their work and recognize the implications of US actions on their analysis.

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*Analysis would provide the elements that could be combined in imaginative ways to create something new, a process the Greeks saw as the antithesis of analysis, or synthesis.*

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A new relationship would also be likely to lead to a new approach to the warning function. The current system is threat-focused and causes tension between “warners” and those who are warned (“warnees”), as Sherman Kent outlined in one of his last talks before retirement.<sup>37</sup> Kent noted that the present system encourages analysts to “over-warn,” because they incur few costs for flagging possible dangers, while “warnees,” or policymakers, have very strong incentives to “under-react” because anything they do in response to a warning—even simply to convene a meeting to talk about a warning—incurs costs. In a “synthesist-client” relationship the costs would be more evenly spread. Because “warners” face potential costs—at least to their reputations and to their relationships with clients—they would have incentives to think more carefully about when and what they warn.

Even more importantly, the “synthesist-client” relationship would encourage the examination and understanding not just of negative phenomena, but also of the positive. At present the IC rarely, if ever, tries to understand why things *haven't* happened. IC analysts don't examine why some states, actors, or situations are *not* failing, dangerous, or threatening, and they never posit desired outcomes with speculation

about what it would take for those outcomes to be realized. Today, the closest the IC comes to making what might be termed “positive warnings” are the “opportunity analyses”—suggestions, gingerly offered, about what *might* be possible in a given situation. Such timid leaning over Kent's firewall, however, only continues Lippmann's nine-decade-old separation of “the staff which investigates” from “the staff which executes,” committing the analyst neither to the process of policymaking nor to its outcome.

This points to another way in which things would change in a client-system: synthesists will have to be able to make plain to their clients how data they receive fits in to the implementation of policy. In the existing system, analysts' allegiance is to their data. Their faith in an “objective reality” allows them to create their own standards for choosing information and thus, by implication, for interpreting it and sustaining their own beliefs, biases, and assumptions. In client relationships, synthesists must, of course, have faith in the data they advance, but they must be able to put that data into policy contexts. This presumes that synthesists will have spent long periods of time gaining substantive expertise—meaning they will have learned their areas of specialization *and* the ways and needs of policymak-

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*What are synthesists to do if they believe policy goals are wrong?*

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ers (whether through rotations, special training, or other means) before being able to claim the new title of “synthesist.” Having achieved that status, the synthesist would then at some level accept the policy goal as legitimate and desirable, even though the way in which he or she best serves the client is in arguing—strenuously if need be—about the tactics by which a strategy might be achieved.

### ***The Risks***

This brings us to the potentially most painful aspect of the client-service model. What are synthesists to do if they believe policy goals are wrong? To ask such a question supposes that a synthesist has already attempted to convince a client why a particular goal is undesirable, may be more costly to achieve than the client supposes, or will not obtain the results the policymaker hopes to achieve. Certainly the synthesist will have done due-diligence to determine whether a policy is illegal, domestically or internationally, and will have advised the client accordingly. Conceivably the synthesist may even have argued to the policymaker that the proposed policy would be bad politics, because in the US system it is the voters who are the ultimate judges of whether or not policy goals are desirable.

In this circumstance lies the starker difference between Sherman Kent’s model of analysis and that of client service. Kent accepted Lippmann’s notion of “intelligence officials” who would have life tenure, revokable only following “trial by their colleagues.” Of course, not all analysts have been content to remain in the IC, even with that faculty-like job protection, but when they have resigned they have often done so publicly and acrimoniously, protesting that senior policymakers have “politicized intelligence.”

In a client model, there would be no such option—a client-service provider, a lawyer for example, can always refuse to take a particular client, but that is not a matter about which lawyers have any particular reason to go public. What it does mean, however, is that a lawyer is no longer employed by a particular client. When the client is the government and its policymakers, the refusal of intelligence synthesists to “take a case” would mean that in the end they must be prepared to surrender their access to that policymaker.

Does that mean a synthesist must resign from government service entirely? Perhaps, if a client-service relationship has gone spectacularly wrong. But this is not likely to occur in the publicity-seeking way it has in

the existing system. It is more likely, however, that a synthesist sufficiently senior to have worked closely with policymakers would have valuable analytic skills that could still be of service, or he or she could find other policy clients. For the time being at least, the IC is the monopoly intelligence provider to the government, which provides a very large pool of potential clients.<sup>38</sup>

### ***No Prescriptions, but a Few Descriptions***

Just as there is no transitional stage halfway between ice and water, so is there no real middle ground in a shift from the customer-product model to the client-service model. The policymaking and the analytic communities of today mirror one another, conceptualizing the world in the same ways, carving problems up into the same geographic and functional subsets<sup>39</sup>—all of which are funded, or not, by a congressional system that also follows the same basic taxonomy.

A shift to a new model of interaction between policymakers and those who assist them with intelligence would require fundamental transformations on both sides, but it is not the goal of this article to lay out precisely what a client-synthesist relationship might look like. The experiences of organizations like IBM, which have made comparable transitions<sup>40</sup> — in IBM’s case from selling mainframes to “making govern-

ments smarter”—suggest that there is no one template or model. IBM and consultant services like it build systems of methods and approaches, not processes, all of which iterate and evolve as client-provider partnerships move toward the chosen goals of their clients.

Still, it is clear that certain things would be necessary if the IC were to move toward the client-service model. Most important, of course, is the *will to change*.<sup>41</sup> If the DNI's *Vision 2015: A Globally Networked and Integrated Intelligence Enterprise* is to be taken at face value, that will already exists in the document's assurance that the analyst of the future will ask policymakers not, “what are your intelligence priorities?” but rather, “what do you want to accomplish?”

If we indeed start asking policymakers what they want to accomplish and they begin trusting us enough to listen to our answers, a number of changes seem inevitable.

*Analytic outreach would no longer have to be mandated.* The value of information provided to a client would not be measured in the cost of its acquisition and protection, but in the utility of that information in serving a client's purpose.<sup>42</sup> Synthesists trying to serve policymaker clients would have no incentive to hoard information and every incentive to look for information and

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*The value of information provided to a client would not be measured in the cost of its acquisition and protection, but in the utility of that information in serving a client's purpose*

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insight, wherever they might be found.

*Formal analytic standards, as currently imposed, would be starting points in a client service system rather than end points in themselves.* Today's formal standards were instituted to address the same criticisms noted in the Cunningham, Schlesinger, Church, and Aspin-Brown Reports—policymakers are cut off from the collection of information and do not know how to evaluate, put in context, or otherwise use what comes off the end of the “finished intelligence product” assembly line. Formal standards of analytic tradecraft were imposed to address aspects of that problem but still do not ensure that policymakers receive the information they want or need. Present tradecraft standards require only that products be relevant to US national security, but as the Church Committee pointed out, absent consumer guidance, what defines that relevance is merely the opinion of an analyst, rather than stated policymaker needs.

*Repurposing the IC would probably require viewing our human resources in a different light.* At present we hire large numbers of people who have experience in foreign countries, speak foreign languages, and under-

stand foreign cultures, and then we limit their foreign travel and contact with foreigners. As Brookings scholar Kenneth Lieberthal noted in a recent critique of the IC analytic community's ability to understand China, “Those numerous Americans who have had enough exposure to China to gain deep personal insights are almost systematically excluded from bringing those insights to bear in the IC analytical community [because they can't clear the hiring security process]. Indeed, should they be one of the few such individuals that come into the community, they will have to give up their ability to keep their understanding fresh through the types of exposure to Chinese realities that they have learned to master.” As a result, “to the IC analyst, China—even as it has opened up to an unprecedented extent—is overwhelmingly a place that exists on paper but not one that provides personal experiences that generate real insights.”<sup>43</sup>

#### *What else might change?*

- A client service organization would have to find the means of measuring value other than as units of output. This would tend to reward personality types for their ability to share and be creative, as opposed to their ability to absorb and

A client-synthesist relationship would be more conversation than “product,” a series of iterative loops in which both sides would get smarter.

retain information. The new system would require more empathetic extroverts and fewer introverts.

- Management styles and criteria would have to evolve—client-service organizations tend to be much flatter and more nimble than are product-creation ones.

- The IC’s existing, hyperspecialized account structures are deeply incompatible with a client-service model, where it is never possible or justified to claim something is not in one’s “lane.” No good service provider can justify the expense, and the large staff, implied by the degree of IC specialization. The client service model rewards flexibility, curiosity, and broad inquiry, since there is never a way to be certain that a piece of information or way of thinking is irrelevant.

- Products would have to change. As Mark Lowenthal has noted, the regular delivery of bland, “corporate-voiced” written products has a lulling effect, making everything the IC does seem to be of equal value, with nothing in the product stream “that screams ‘read me now.’”<sup>44</sup> Miller made the same point, arguing that production of “duh” reports and analysis...desensitizes policymak-

ers to quality intelligence products.”<sup>45</sup>

- We would have to move away from the conviction that “anything can be solved by adding more facts.”<sup>46</sup> Alfred Rollington, the CEO of Jane’s most responsible for transforming the company from a purveyor of locked-down, hardbound sets of defense-related encyclopedias to being an “information group” with the stated mission “to help our clients make the best decisions,”<sup>47</sup> argues that in today’s policy world “few respect information’s authority,” in part because “the clients believe they have as much to contribute as the specialists.”<sup>48</sup>

- A client-synthesist relationship would be more conversation than “product,” a series of iterative loops in which both sides would get smarter, drawing on resources and making connections that neither might have been aware they had and, when necessary, going out to find them when they don’t. In short, the “deliverable” in such a relationship would be a process, not an endpoint, and would be measured by the degree to which it promotes *cognition*, not by the number of its pages.

**Challenging? Yes.  
Frightening? Beyond a doubt.**

*Will it work?* Although it is one of the many hallmarks of the networked, complex world that nothing is fully predictable, there are grounds for confidence. Some activities already are underway that have important characteristics of what the new relationship might look like. Interactive gaming, situation-response simulations, and scenario-forecasting exercises all put analysts and policymakers (or members of their staffs) together in activities which—when done well—approximate what a client-adviser relationship might look like. While it remains based in the current analyst-policymaker world, the “Asking Better Questions” training course offered through the Department of Defense’s Institute for Analysis does give analysts a sense of how they might iterate with policymakers even within the present system to help both sides draw closer to answering the “question behind the question” and thus make the analytic product potentially more useful. The private-sector experience of both IBM and Jane’s also helps argue that the gulf between the two systems can be bridged.

*What is our alternative?* It has already been 44 years since the Cunningham Report warned,

*The unmanaged state of intelligence [meant that] analysts were becoming*

*superficial because of the piles of paper in their in-boxes, and any analysis in depth was becoming out of the question.... Much of what intelligence considered its responsibilities were our own response to vague guidelines or transient indications of interest at top levels. More and more, the community was talking to itself.<sup>49</sup>*

At a time when the US federal budget deficit is expected to exceed \$1.17 trillion, and the federal debt is 14 times larger still, it doesn't take much analytic expertise to wonder how long the country's policymakers will continue to fund these "subscriptions they never wanted," especially if all they contain is the IC "talking to itself."



### In Sum

Former Jane's CEO Alfred Rollington in a 2008 presentation on open-source intelligence expressed as well as anyone the reasons for shifting from customer-service to client-service partnerships. "As analysts and consultants," he wrote, "we have to be aware of the new client requirements for actionable intelligence that will measurably save them people, time and money, bearing always in mind that Intelligence must be designed for the action and the understanding of the final user." As a final admonition, he also reminded analysts to "continually re-educate yourselves to ensure that someone in another country who you will never meet, cannot take your job." As an aid to contemplate what this change might mean, we offer the following schematic:

Analyzing for policymakers	Synthesizing with policymakers
What do you want to know?	What do you want to accomplish?
Threat focused	Opportunity focused
Past oriented	Future oriented
Tends to be tactical	Must be strategic
Product	Process
Search for comparisons and analogies	Attention to contrasts and the unique
Interest in objects and nuggets	Interest in contexts and relations
Reactive	Proactive
Introverts and accounts	Extroverts and conversations
Tends to focus on what has failed	Allows examination of what has succeeded
Rewards ingenuity—big systems, more manpower, specialization, broad programs	Rewards imagination—agile, adaptive systems, less hierarchy, more networked
Collection	Cognition



## A New President, a Better CIA, and an Old War: Eisenhower and Intelligence Reporting on Korea, 1953

*Clayton D. Laurie*

***In both Eisenhower's larger foreign policy focus and in the waning months of the Korean War, the Central Intelligence Agency played a larger role than it ever had before in its short life.***

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The ongoing war in Korea, stalemated since the summer of 1951, proved the most immediate and nettlesome problem for President Eisenhower when he took office in January 1953.<sup>a</sup> As a soldier, candidate, and president, Eisenhower had supported the decision to intervene in Korea as both the necessary and right thing to do as part of the larger policy of opposing worldwide communist expansion. He sympathized with President Harry Truman's difficult situation, especially at the time of the Chinese intervention in November 1950, and during the controversies associated with the firing of Gen. Douglas MacArthur and the problems he faced in keeping the UN coalition together after the war bogged down. After

observing events from afar, Eisenhower came to see Korea as a “sorry mess” with no obvious way out.<sup>1</sup>

During the 1952 presidential campaign, candidate Eisenhower hesitated to criticize the Truman administration's prosecution of the war until pressed to do so by his campaign managers. As a result, Eisenhower's rhetoric on the subject became more pointed as the election neared. The foreign policy of President Truman and Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson had “invited” the communist invasion, Eisenhower implied on several occasions after easily winning the Republican nomination in August 1952 over the isolationist wing of the party that had backed Senator Robert A. Taft. In Detroit on 14 October, he declared that the war was “a telling symbol of the foreign policy of our nation,” reflecting the “lack of imagination and firmness in the overall political direction which guides all security planning.” It was, he said, a calamity that befell the nation

<sup>a</sup> This paper is drawn from an article by the author entitled “The Invisible Hand of the New Look: Eisenhower and the CIA,” published in Dennis E. Showalter, ed. *Forging the Shield: Eisenhower and National Security for the Twenty-first Century* (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 2005), 93–110, and from a paper delivered at the symposium on Dwight D. Eisenhower held during 26–28 January 2005 at Fort McNair, Washington, DC.

*The endnotes are available in the digital version of this article at [www.cia.gov](http://www.cia.gov).*

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*All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in this article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.*

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*After January 1953, CIA served a president who clearly understood the Agency, a man who had become accustomed to the use of intelligence in tactical and strategic roles.*

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because of a lack of “leadership, wisdom, and courage.” Eisenhower stated that a solution to the Korean War demanded new leadership because the “old administration could not be expected to repair what it had failed to prevent.”<sup>2</sup> He pledged to find an “intelligent and honorable way to end the tragic toll of America’s casualties in Korea” and promised to go to Korea to find a way to end the war.<sup>3</sup> Eisenhower defeated Democratic presidential candidate Adlai E. Stevenson by more than 5 million votes.

The president-elect acted quickly on his campaign pledge to go to Korea, reaching Seoul on 2 December. During the next two weeks, he met with military commanders, Generals

Mark W. Clark and James Van Fleet, visited US and UN military units along the main line of resistance, and briefly consulted with South Korea’s troublesome president Syngman Rhee. He endorsed the stalled truce talks at Panmunjom and politely listened to then-retired General MacArthur’s plans for a renewed UN offensive against Chinese armies that could involve atomic weapons and the ultimate unification of the peninsula by force.

Yet, seeking to end the war rather than expand it, the president-elect conceded the “unlikelihood of achieving ‘a positive and definite victory without possibly running the grave risk of enlarging the war.’” Eisenhower saw Korea as a costly distraction that kept his administration from formulating a more comprehensive national security policy. Effecting a truce, as opposed to a World War II-style total military victory, thus became the primary focus of his incoming administration. While the president-elect did not have a specific plan for ending the war in December 1952, he wanted to move ahead, unencumbered by the tactical problems presented by Korea.<sup>4</sup>

In both Eisenhower’s larger foreign policy focus and in the waning months of the Korean War, the Central



Ike meets the press after his meeting on 17 December 1952 with Douglas MacArthur. Secretary of State Dulles looks on. Photo © Bettman/Corbis

Intelligence Agency played a larger role than it ever had before in its short life. Much had changed since 1950, when the war broke out.

- First, the CIA was an entirely different organization. It was larger in terms of personnel and budget, and it had been thoroughly reorganized and reformed by Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, Truman’s director of central intelligence during the last two years of his second term.
- Second, after January 1953, CIA served a president who clearly understood the Agency, a man who had become accustomed to the use of intelligence in tactical and strategic roles during a military career dating back to 1915.
- Third, by 1953 the CIA had become an integral part of government decision making structures in Washington and in the field, where its expertise in collection, analysis, and operations had gained increased respect. By the time Eisenhower took his oath of office, the Agency was beginning to fulfill the role mandated by the 1947 National Security Act as a centralized and well-connected organization for professional intelligence—a designation that had existed only in name before 1950.
- Finally, in Allen Welsh Dulles, Eisenhower had a pragmatic and long-serving intelligence professional directing CIA, which he did through Eisen-

hower's two terms. A strong and charismatic leader with experience in diplomacy and policymaking, Dulles moved comfortably within military and government circles, becoming the Agency's most effective manager to date.<sup>5</sup> Brother of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles helped end the turf wars stemming from bureaucratic rivalries or personal animosities that had plagued CIA relations with other government departments, especially the Acheson State Department.<sup>6</sup> During Eisenhower's presidency, the chief executive, DCI, and secretary of state worked as a friendly and collegial team on matters dealing with Korea and the larger Cold War.

President Eisenhower thus enjoyed significant foreign policy and intelligence advantages that President Truman had lacked.

### **A New Organization**

The Central Intelligence Agency grew tremendously after the outbreak of the Korean War. It did so because of the expected increase in demands on intelligence resulting from the outbreak of war and perceived increased aggressiveness of international communism. But the CIA also matured thanks to the diligent efforts of DCI Smith. Working from recommendations contained in the 1949 Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report on intelligence reform,<sup>7</sup> Smith implemented far-reaching and

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*The Central Intelligence Agency grew tremendously after the outbreak of the Korean War.*

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lasting reorganizations, while also becoming a ceaseless CIA advocate. Immediately upon taking office in October 1950, Smith moved assertively to increase the Agency's size, budget, and influence, especially focusing on the Agency's relationships with the State Department and military services. During the next two years, the Agency trebled the number of employees and doubled the number of intelligence analysts. The CIA budget increased more than fivefold. By early 1953, the CIA nearly matched the size, budget, and capabilities of the wartime Office of Strategic Services.

In its relations with other departments, Smith emphasized the importance of the CIA as the government's preeminent intelligence organization as mandated in the National Security Act of 1947, insisting that the organization and its employees command the respect its work deserved and that it hold a secure place at the policymaker's table as one among equals. While the CIA's improved performance in Korea assured this heightened regard, Smith made clear he did not want any of his deputies to go hat-in-hand to any department. Noted for his temperament and for his bluntness, the DCI would not allow CIA to take second place to either the State Department or military services. As one subordinate noted "Beetle...was a very even-tempered man. He was always

in a rage." His Agency colleagues noted occasions when the irate DCI would hang up on phone calls not to his liking, or give orders to subordinates not to accede to demands for visits to other government departments. If those departments needed Agency input, their people could come to CIA offices and not the other way around.<sup>8</sup>

While Smith's reforming zeal affected all parts of the Agency, perhaps nowhere did it have as much impact as on analytical offices. Working with CIA's William H. Jackson, Smith determined three major areas of improvement:

- the need to ensure consistent, systematic production of estimates;



Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, as General Eisenhower's chief of staff. Photo © Bettman/Corbis

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*"The force of Allen Dulles' leadership and his recognition throughout the government as the quintessential case officer accounted in large part for the enhancement and shift in the Agency's position."*

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- the need to strengthen the position of the DCI relative to the departmental intelligence components; and
- the need to delineate research and analysis functions.

Smith stated that the CIA's national intelligence estimates should command respect for their quality throughout the government. To make sure this came to pass, Smith established the Office of National Estimates (ONE) under the respected academic and former OSS Research and Analysis Branch veteran William Langer. ONE changed processes to ensure that Agency analytical products received thorough military and policy-making coordination. Langer made sure ONE focused on Korean reporting and global Chinese and Soviet activities and made sure policymakers heard one voice.<sup>9</sup>

Smith did not stop there. He formed the Office of Current Intelligence by amalgamating existing offices to include a new 24-hour watch service to handle "hot information." At the same time, he continued production of popular analytical products such as the *Daily Summary*, *Daily Digest*, *Current Intelligence Bulletin*, and *Current Intelligence Review*. The founding of a new Office of Research and Reports (ORR) containing seven analytical

divisions soon followed. Finally, on 2 January 1952, Smith formed the Directorate of Intelligence to coordinate all six CIA analytical offices under veteran analyst Loftus Becker.<sup>a10</sup> By the following year, Becker's directorate had 10 times the number of analysts CIA had in 1947.

Thus, by 1953, tempered by war and reformed and reorganized, CIA was ready to provide the intelligence Eisenhower needed to direct the war and reshape the nation's foreign policies and defense strategies.<sup>11</sup> As President Eisenhower noted of DCI Smith on retirement that year,

*Through his firmness and tact, perceptiveness and judgment, and withal, through his brilliant leadership in a position of highest responsibility, he assured the realization of that ideal of a coordinated intelligence effort which was set forth by the Congress in 1947, and brought to a new height of effectiveness the intelli-*

*gence machinery of the United States Government. Through his well-grounded and clearly defined concept of intelligence, reinforced by his recognized integrity and high personal prestige, he won acceptance of the principle that policy decisions must be based on sound intelligence.<sup>12</sup>*

Smith's contributions allowed the CIA to emerge in 1953 "as an integral element in high-level US policymaking."<sup>13</sup>

### ***A New, Connected Director***

President Eisenhower's appointment of Allen Dulles as Smith's replacement in February 1953 proved to be astute. As one historian noted, "The force of Allen Dulles' leadership and his recognition throughout the government as the quintessential case officer accounted in large part for the enhancement and shift in the Agency's position." Yet "the reason for Dulles's influence extended well beyond his personal qualities and inclinations. The composition of the United States government, international events, and senior policymaker's perceptions of the role the Agency could play in United States foreign policy converged to make Dulles' position in the government and that of the Agency unique."<sup>14</sup> The regard the president had for the Agency stemmed in large measure from his high personal opinion of Allen Dulles as a career foreign service officer, lawyer, and intelligence professional. As

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<sup>a</sup> The new DI contained six overt offices: the Office of Collection and Dissemination, the Office of Scientific Intelligence, the Office of National Estimates, the Office of Research and Reports, the Office of Current Intelligence, and the Office of Intelligence Coordination. The addition of another group, the Office of Operations, completed the CIA's analytical overhaul in late February 1952.

presidential aide Andrew Goodpaster later recalled, "Eisenhower had a lot of respect for Allen Dulles growing out of Dulles's work during the war. The president thought he was very skilled at top-level intelligence—collecting it and analyzing it." Thus, under Dulles, "the CIA gained a reputation among United States government agencies as a young, vital institution serving the highest national purpose."<sup>15</sup> For the first time in CIA's history, other government departments recognized that the Agency had a true intelligence professional at the helm.

### **A New President**

Yet perhaps more than any other factor, the growing importance and status of the CIA after 1953 was due to the attitude, perceptiveness, and knowledge of Dwight D. Eisenhower. Unlike his predecessor, Eisenhower's experiences as SHAEF and NATO commander, and as JCS chair and US Army chief of staff, educated him in the value of tactical and strategic intelligence, an awareness he brought to the White House. He once stated

*In war, nothing is more important to a commander than the facts concerning the strength, dispositions, and intentions of his opponent, and the proper interpretation of those facts. In peace-time, the necessary facts are of a different nature. They deal with conditions, resources,*

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*President Eisenhower sought and received regular CIA analytical products. He also received in-person briefings in the White House from Agency officials.*

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*requirements, and attitudes prevailing in the world. They and their correct interpretation are essential to the development of policy to further our long-term national security and best interests.<sup>16</sup>*

The president clearly recognized the importance of intelligence to inform his decisions. During the months remaining in the Korean War, President Eisenhower sought and received regular CIA analytical products.<sup>17</sup> He also received in-person briefings in the White House from Agency officials, continuing a procedure begun soon after he became the Republican presidential nominee. Indeed, prior to his December 1952 visit to Korea and after he became the president-elect, Eisenhower asked DCI Smith to deliver these pre-inaugural intelligence briefings, claiming "He was not comfortable relying exclusively on US Army information regarding what was going on in Korea."<sup>18</sup>

After he assumed office, the process changed as Eisenhower came to rely overwhelmingly on periodic high-level briefings and NIEs for intelligence to inform his decision making. Those at CIA observed that the new president actually avoided reading daily intelligence reports from any single government agency, preferring to see the finalized consensus of many

analytical offices that had been polished at CIA. On the top end, DCI Dulles continued to provide most intelligence briefings at the opening of the weekly NSC meetings that Eisenhower always presided over.

Unlike Truman, who infrequently attended NSC meetings, Eisenhower considered the group to be the backbone of his foreign and military decisionmaking team. Here, the DCI covered broad subjects of interest to the president cleared in advance with the NSC secretary and the president's special assistant for national security affairs. While Dulles was himself well-informed about political issues, he tended to defer to Agency subject-matter experts on scientific and military topics outside his normal purview.



The Dulles brothers, Allen on the left (1948). Photo © Bettman/Corbis

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*While he appreciated the CIA's capabilities and analytical products, Eisenhower also recognized Agency shortcomings.*

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The NSC briefing process served the president and the Agency well. Dulles enjoyed a venue in which he could provide CIA-gathered and analyzed intelligence to all major participants at one time and place. At the same time he received a good indication of what intelligence the president wanted and what operations he approved of or needed. According to Andrew Goodpaster,

*Eisenhower expected Dulles to provide the latest intelligence on the crisis of the moment but, more important, to concentrate primarily on providing the intelligence background to whatever larger or longer term planning issue was on the agenda.<sup>19</sup>*

Eisenhower respected the NIEs and often asked the CIA to analyze issues of specific importance or interest to him. To these requests, the Agency gladly responded, and it continually updated its reporting with the most recent all source intelligence.<sup>20</sup>

DCIs Smith and Dulles were aware of earlier criticisms, particularly from the Acheson State Department and MacArthur's Far East Command, that the CIA had failed in 1950 to warn the Truman administration of the Korean invasion and the subsequent Chinese

intervention. With these in mind, both DCIs acted to strengthen analysis and reporting.<sup>21</sup> Indeed, Eisenhower considered warning to be a primary CIA mission. DCI Dulles took the warning function very seriously as well, and he emphasized the need to get warning right and to get it quickly to policymakers and military commanders. "An intelligence service today," Dulles wrote,

*has an additional responsibility, for it cannot wait for evidence of the likelihood of hostile acts against us or until after the decision to strike has been made by another power. Our government must be both forewarned and forearmed. A close-knit, coordinated intelligence service, continually on the alert, able to report accurately and quickly on developments in almost any part of the globe, is the best insurance we can take against surprise. The fact that intelligence is alert, that there is a possibility of forewarning, could itself constitute one of the most effective deterrents to a potential enemy's appetite for attack.<sup>22</sup>*

Providing adequate strategic and tactical warning intelligence would remain a peren-

nial intelligence problem throughout the Eisenhower administration, however, as it would in the years and decades beyond, but Dulles and his successors constantly sought ways to improve Agency processes and functions.

While he appreciated the CIA's capabilities and analytical products, Eisenhower also recognized Agency shortcomings. Eisenhower often noted he did not always receive the quality of intelligence or the successful covert operations he wanted or envisioned. With respect to analysis, he frequently expressed concern that Agency analysts overestimated numbers and capabilities—and thereby the threat.<sup>23</sup> Thus, while President Eisenhower trusted and respected the CIA for what it did and could do, he also recognized that there were limits to what the Agency could realistically accomplish.

The president often reminisced about the type and quality of intelligence provided during his days as SHAEF commander during World War II, wanting

*Dulles to serve him as General [Kenneth] Strong had served him during the war, to be in fact as well as in name his chief intelligence officer; the man who would give him an overview, to be sure the President got the informa-*

*tion he needed to act, while screening him from petty detail.<sup>24</sup>*

By most accounts, Dulles and the CIA, at least during the final six months of the Korean War, did provide the president the type of intelligence he required and screened out the useless detail. Dulles never became a figure like General Strong had been for Eisenhower, nor did he fulfill the president's expectation that he become an effective manager of the entire US intelligence community as it emerged from the Korean War.

The CIA continued the high level of current and long-range intelligence reporting on Korea for President Eisenhower as it had done during the final two years of Harry S. Truman's time in office.<sup>25</sup> Perhaps most notably, the CIA provided ongoing tactical military reporting to Eisenhower from the time of his nomination well into his early presidency, especially on Chinese military and diplomatic capabilities and intentions, culminating in a National Intelligence Estimate in April 1953.

This estimate, like the consistent reporting to date, informed the president that the military capabilities of the People's Republic of China in Korea and in general "had grown steadily" since mid-1951, in terms of the quantity and quality of men, materiel, organization, and logistics, especially in the air.

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Far from exhausted by the conflict, the Agency informed the president that the Chinese remained in a position to counter any US or UN intensification or expansion of the conflict, matching any escalation tit-for-tat promising an escalating stalemate and war without end.<sup>26</sup> Taken with other CIA military reporting, this NIE probably dashed any remaining hopes Eisenhower may have entertained based on the optimistic projections from his military commanders and South Korea's Syngman Rhee of a potential military victory, confirming his earlier impression that a negotiated armistice remained the only workable option for ending the conflict.

In early 1953, despite the not-too-closely-held secret that the United States considered using atomic weapons to end the war, especially the recently developed tactical atomic cannon, it was the death of Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin in March that finally spurred the PRC to return to armistice negotiations in earnest as CIA reporting implied.<sup>27</sup> Noting that President Eisenhower also sought an exit from Korea—and was prepared to negotiate a settlement with the communist powers much along the lines of his predecessor—the Agency's analytical offices focused their reporting on issues that had

stalled the truce talks since mid-1951, namely the POW repatriation issue that remained of overriding importance to China. By late spring, the Agency reported to the president that this one issue was "the sole remaining obstacle to a Korean Armistice."<sup>28</sup> Noting this sticking point, President Eisenhower urged his negotiators to work toward a compromise.

While POW repatriation remained the sole outstanding issue between the major combatant powers, the issue of the continued opposition of South Korean President Rhee to any armistice agreement that left the peninsula divided, remained a problem for President Eisenhower until the second week of July 1953. Through the spring, Agency analysts reported on the back-and-forth talks and negotiations between US and UN negotiators and the recalcitrant South Korean president, stating that in spite of Rhee's attempts to sabotage the armistice negotiations, he would nonetheless have no alternative but to accept that the war would end where it had begun—at the 38th parallel. With US guarantees of military and economic aid programs, Rhee allowed the armistice to go forward.<sup>29</sup>

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*In the final analysis ... the Central Intelligence Agency grew enormously to meet the demands of the conflict, and changed forever as a result.*

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Once the 27 July 1953 armistice took effect, CIA continued reporting to the president on Soviet and Chinese reactions to the agreement and conditions on the peninsula, as well as the on-going and often publicly expressed disappointment of Syngman Rhee that the war had concluded before reunification of north and south under his control. In particular, with the warning mission in mind, Agency analysts kept the president up-to-date on the prospects for renewed fighting and on-going communist involvement in Korea for years after the end of the conflict.<sup>30</sup>

By late 1953, however, the Eisenhower administration had moved on to larger Cold War issues, as did the Central Intelligence Agency—gradually increasing both the number of employees and the size of its budget to meet new threats and increased demands.

In the final analysis, while the Central Intelligence Agency grew enormously to meet the demands of the conflict, and changed forever as a result, the Korean War did not become “a defining experience” or an issue

that played “an inordinate role” in President Eisenhower’s foreign and defense policies, as historian Allan Millett has written. Indeed, in a larger sense, “the war liberated national security policy from the unrealistic economic shackles imposed by the Truman administration” and allowed Eisenhower to reshape the nation’s military and foreign policies to more closely fit what he viewed as a “proper national security policy.” “The Korean War slid into a secondary issue behind ‘security with solvency,’ Eisenhower’s “long-term plans for rational force-structuring, stable budgeting below current levels, and an NSC-centered decision-making architecture.” Security with solvency became “the New Look” defense policy of the Eisenhower administration with issuance of NSC 162/2 in October 1953, appearing three months following the July 1953 Korean armistice.<sup>31</sup> The Cold War would soon expand well beyond the Korean armistice line for both the Eisenhower administration and the Central Intelligence Agency.



## **The International Politics of Intelligence Sharing**

James Igoe Walsh, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 208 pp.

**Reviewed by J.B. Webb**

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Usually I think about the risks of intelligence sharing as a problem of how reliable Washington's partners are. But the massive Wikileaks.com disclosures of classified US military documents on Afghanistan and Iraq and cables from the US Department of State naturally draw the questions "Might our partners think we are untrustworthy and will some of them scale back sharing?" Fortunately, James Walsh's *The International Politics of Intelligence Sharing* offers a timely way to rethink what drives intelligence-sharing relationships and perhaps some reassurance. Walsh, a political scientist at North Carolina who humorously portrays himself as researching and teaching about "bad things," offers an argument on intelligence sharing that stresses state interests rather than trust alone, suggesting the fallout may not be so bad.

Walsh sees intelligence as a commodity. States share out of mutual interest or to extract things like foreign aid and security assurances. (7) He argues that the secret nature of intelligence gives rise to two key problems. The "sellers" of intelligence can't be sure that "buyers" will adequately protect what they receive, and "buyers" cannot be sure of the veracity of the intelligence they get from "sellers." (13) To solve this classic cooperation problem, Walsh dips into social economic theory for answers. He applies relational contracting, a branch of transactional economics, to address the sticky bargaining and enforcement problems that come from the intelligence sharing dilemma of never knowing if your partner is going to double-cross you. (15–25)

Walsh crisply takes his readers through four hypotheses and finds mixed support for them. His hypotheses are:

- Large gains are a necessary condition for intelligence sharing.
- Intelligence is shared through anarchic institutions.
- If one state is concerned that its partner will defect, it will seek to construct a "hierarchical" relationship.
- Power imbalances are a necessary but not sufficient condition for creating such a hierarchy.

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*All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.*

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To test his hypotheses, Walsh draws on a range of historical US intelligence relationships, such as its transatlantic intelligence relationships with Britain, Germany, and France against the Soviet Union during the Cold War; US intelligence cooperation with South Vietnam against the Vietcong in the 1970s; Washington's engagement of Bogotá in counternarcotics in the 1980s; and finally Washington's current counterterrorism policies. The only non-US-related case examined is the development of intelligence sharing within the European Union in the 1990s.

In cases in which mutual interests are strong and the value of sharing intelligence is high, Walsh finds that states have little need for a highly structured relationship. The US-UK relationship during the Cold War is the shining example here. (38–43) Walsh uses Washington's concern about the reliability of Paris during the Cold War to illustrate that when one partner deems intelligence sharing to be of little value, shared interests are weak, and where there are concerns that a partner might be unreliable, states forgo the risk of forming a working intelligence relationship. (47–48)

His most thought provoking analysis is in cases where state interest in sharing intelligence and worries about unreliable partners are both high, much like the US-Pakistan relationship as seen by some today. He emphasizes that "hierarchical control"—the case in which one state directly controls aspects of another state's intelligence activities—is the key to hedging against suspect but needed partners.

It is the combination of interests and signaling of sustained commitment, I think, that are the most significant aspects of his argument. In the examples he uses of Germany during the Cold War and South Vietnam during the Vietnam War, Walsh shows that the United States was able to make these intelligence relationships work because it gained control over parts of its partners' services. This was possible because the United States was a dominant power, had strong institutions, more resources for attacking the problems, and, most importantly, because Washington communicated a keen sense of the importance of fighting the Russians and the Vietcong, respectively, buttressing shared interests along the way. (51–55; 72–78) In contrast, Walsh shows that US intelligence sharing with Colombia was significantly more limited because US shared interests with Bogotá were only moderate at best and because Washington provided fewer resources to fighting drug cartels as interest in combating the drug problem fluctuated. (79, 84–87)

Walsh's argument that, by providing money, training, and other intangibles, states can lead other states to share intelligence against their competing interests is persuasive. And while I also agree with intelligence field officers who might argue that trust is far more important to sharing in the field, it is the degree of shared interests that truly matters in intelligence relationships between nations. That is why I am skeptical of Walsh's assertion that states may be convinced to "specialize" in certain areas of intelligence (9, 19, 123–4) for the purpose of sharing. After all, intelligence services exist to help safeguard the state against a range of threats, and it is hard to imagine that policymakers would ever narrow their services' focus to single national security interests.

Some readers undoubtedly will take issue with the theoretically broad approach Walsh takes. But where we should really focus debate is on his concept of “hierarchy” in intelligence relationships. Though the United States, for example, may be able to provide pledges of support that other states want in exchange for information, the fact remains that in some cases Washington’s has an extremely great need for certain information or certain skills to get information. When that is combined with the limited number of partners capable of “selling” that which Washington needs, the United States ends up not being the dominant player in the intelligence relationship, despite its resources.

The focus on interests and how to maximize shared ones, rather than mutual trust, is a key idea to keep in mind as the United States engages its intelligence partners in the wake of the WikiLeaks debacle. I suspect our partners will want to know what new things we will do to better safeguard secrets in the future. Underscoring and recommitting to the shared interests that drive our intelligence relationships, however, is probably more important, and something Washington could consider communicating to its partners as it cleans up from this mess.





## ***SIX: A History of Britain's Secret Intelligence Service—Part 1: Murder and Mayhem, 1909–1939***

Michael Smith (London: Dialogue, 2010), 468 pp., endnotes, bibliography, photos, appendices, index.

**Reviewed by Hayden Peake**

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By repute, the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) is the oldest, most experienced, and most secret in the Western world. Today, according to former Chief of Secret Service (CSS), Sir Colin McColl, this not unhelpful “myth...of excellence and secrecy” surrounds the SIS.<sup>a</sup> Intelligence historians have addressed the question of British myth versus reality with considerable vigor. Building on the ground breaking work of Mildred Gladys Richings in her 1935 book, *Espionage: The Story of the Secret Service of the English Crown*,<sup>b</sup> Christopher Andrew, in his 1986 book *Her Majesty's Secret Service*,<sup>c</sup> examined the British intelligence record from the Victorian era to the late 20th century. He recognized that historical coverage of the subject was uneven. One reason, to Andrew's dismay, was that even though records from WW II had been released, many documents from earlier years remained classified “on the dotty grounds that intelligence gathering before the war must remain more secret than during the war.”<sup>d</sup> The availability of primary sources has improved since Andrew made that complaint, and former British army intelligence officer Michael Smith has used them well in his history of the SIS from its 1909 origin to 1939.

Smith begins his story in the early 20th century when books like *The Invasion of 1910*, and *Spies of the Kaiser*, both by journalist William Le Queux, grossly exaggerated the threat of German espionage in Britain.<sup>e</sup> Nevertheless, the result was a greatly aroused public at a time when Britain had no civilian organization to deal with the espionage threat whatever its magnitude. Why was a civilian organization needed? The War Office had only one overtaxed civilian intelligence

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<sup>a</sup> Colin McColl, BBC Radio 4 interview, 29 July 2009.

<sup>b</sup> M. G. Richings, *Espionage: The Story of the Secret Service of the English Crown* (London: Hutchinson, 1935). Richings describes 600 years of espionage and security operations, ending in 1760.

<sup>c</sup> Christopher Andrew, *Her Majesty's Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence Community* (New York: Viking, 1986)

<sup>d</sup> Andrew, *Her Majesty's Secret Service*, xv.

<sup>e</sup> William Le Queux, *The Invasion of 1910* (London: Hurst & Blackett, 1906); *Spies of the Kaiser* (London: Frank Cass, 1996); the first edition was published in 1909. See also Christopher Moran and Robert Johnson, “In the Service of Empire: Imperialism and the British Spy Thriller, 1901–1914” in *Studies in Intelligence* 54 no. 2 (June 2010) for an examination of the impact of these and other novels about espionage written during the period.

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officer who ran agents in Europe, (4) but couldn't attachés and diplomats supplement his efforts? Smith explains that although the War Office and the Admiralty both had small intelligence staffs that relied on diplomats and attachés, they were models of open source intelligence acquisition and did not want to change. When it came to espionage or any secret intelligence collection, they preferred to decline the honor. The military attaché in Brussels wrote, "I would never do any secret service work." When his counterpart in Berlin was tasked with collecting against his German hosts, he responded that "contact with the class of man...employed in this sort of work...and the measures to which we are obliged to resort are repulsive to me." (3)

Accepting this reality and recognizing the increasing public "spy fever," the Committee of Imperial Defence established a subcommittee to create an organization "that could handle such delicate matters and ensure government officials did not have to dirty their hands by dealing with spies." (7) Hence, in 1909, the independent Secret Service Bureau (SSB) was established with two branches, briefly housed together. The Domestic Branch, initially subordinated to the War Office, and later to the Home Office, eventually became MI5 and was publicly avowed though not publicized.<sup>f</sup> The Foreign Branch was placed under the Admiralty but for cover purposes was designated MI1c, later MI6, the designation from which the book's title is taken. Officially called the SIS, its existence was neither avowed nor officially publicized.<sup>g</sup> (57, 274–75) To preserve its anonymity, SIS imposed "a comprehensive ban on publication of exploits" by serving and retired officers.<sup>h</sup> In practice the ban was selectively applied. More than 100 SIS officers and government officials have published memoirs in which they mentioned their secret service work, but only a few were prosecuted. Others resorted to thinly disguised fiction. The nonfiction accounts are as a rule narrowly focused and not well documented, but they leave no doubt that a secret intelligence service existed. Fiction is at best an imperfect mirror and readers are often left guessing. In *SIX*, Michael Smith takes a broad view, adding new stories, filling in details, using true names and dates, and perhaps most interesting, describing the reactions of government entities to the intelligence they received.

The book is roughly divided between the tenures of first two SIS chiefs of service, Captain Mansfield Smith-Cumming (1909–23) and Admiral Hugh Sinclair (1923–39). Smith addresses several recurrent issues that neither chief resolved completely. The most annoying and persistent were turf battles among elements of the Foreign Office and the War Office that clashed with "C," as the chief was called, over the SIS mission. Equally serious and frequent was an inadequate budget often coupled with increased demands for collection. But the majority of the book deals with operations, their management and execution and their failures and successes.

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<sup>f</sup> Christopher Andrew, *Defend the Realm* (New York: Knopf, 2009), 28; see also Hamil Grant, *Spies and Secret Service* (London: Grant Richards, 1915), 138–46, for the statement released to the public regarding the establishment of the Security Service.

<sup>g</sup> Andrew, *Defend the Realm*, 28. The SIS would not be officially avowed until 1992.

<sup>h</sup> Nigel West (ed.), *The Faber Book of Espionage* (London: Faber & Faber, 1993), 3–4

The sophistication, geographical scope and audacity of the operations are remarkable, especially since Cumming, the first “C,” had no prior management or intelligence experience. Applying his intuition, writes Smith, Cumming selected officers, sent them behind enemy lines to “determine the situation” and they were often successful. Even more remarkable, the officers Cumming selected didn’t have experience in espionage either! The Paul Dukes operation in revolutionary Russia is a good example. (239ff.) Dukes was a concert pianist. Finally, while SIS didn’t provide any training for most of WW I—one learned on the job—written instructions were developed in the field and provided to agents during as the war progressed. (383–99)

While personally recruiting and handling officers and agents, C was also expanding operations worldwide. *SIX* documents a greater concentration of agents operating in Germany, other European nations, and the Middle East during WW I than previously revealed. In discussing these operations Smith shows that despite a genuine demand for intelligence, turf battles among military and civilian elements commanded at least as much attention as running operations.

Several agents and officers addressed in *SIX* have not been previously mentioned or were only briefly acknowledged in earlier intelligence literature. These include journalist Hector Bywater (32, 39); a naval order of battle expert code-named Walter Christmas; and author Arthur Ransome, who received minutes of meetings of the Bolshevik leadership from Trotsky’s secretary Yevginya Shlepina—Ransome’s lover and later his wife. John Leather—cousin to Desmond Morton—a senior SIS officer and later an assistant to Churchill—was arrested, tried, and jailed by the French for espionage. Border control officer Harry Gruner gets less attention but is worth a place in history as the SIS officer who strip-searched Lenin at the Finnish-Russian border—looking for evidence of German support of the Bolsheviks. Gruner was later arrested and sentenced by the Cheka to be shot, a sentence not in fact carried out. (208)

During Cumming’s tenure, SIS was not only involved in intelligence collection. Smith recounts operations that would today be called covert action—the SIS role in the murder of the Russian monk, Rasputin, for example. (199ff) During the discussion, he raises the question of whether SIS officers have a “license to kill”; he quotes wartime officer Jack Lawson, who said circumstances must decide. (160) More traditional assignments discussed include sabotage missions conducted by the Nemesis network out of Denmark and (124) the opening of German diplomatic bags on the Siberian Railway. (124)

When it comes to technical tradecraft, Smith shows how it was often developed on the job. Here too Cumming was involved—for example, in the search for an effective secret writing ink. Smith reveals some curious details concerning SIS’s response to a claim that semen is the best secret “ink,” though “it cannot be stored.” (65–66) *SIX* also looks at problems of agent communication, surveillance, recruitment techniques, and management of overseas stations. Cumming generally let the head of station (HOS) use his initiative without having to check with headquarters first. Author Compton Mackenzie, who was HOS in Greece and—viewed by Smith as something of a loose cannon—initiated what became

the SIS routine cover at embassies years later—the Passport Control Office (PCO). (171)

As WW I drew to a close and the Bolsheviks struggled for dominance, the attention of SIS shifted from Western Europe to Russia, and Smith describes the effect on SIS. Here we learn why Cumming recruited Sidney Reilly—“Ace of Spies”—despite reservations about his character: agents who could pass as Russian were in short supply. In the end, Reilly gets much better marks from Smith than from other writers. He quotes an anonymous former SIS officer who had worked with Riley who said that although Reilly was “written off by historians...[he] has been greatly underrated. He was a very, very good—a valuable agent...[a] more serious operator than the impression given by his myth.” (238) Smith also corrects the record concerning Reilly’s attempt to visit Lenin at the Kremlin: it never happened. (216)

*SIX* concludes with several chapters on SIS during the interwar period. It was a time of fiscal parsimony, staff reduction, mission review and a struggle to survive. The Admiralty and the War Office both pushed for a single intelligence service. Cumming rejected the idea as “utterly unworkable.” In the end he won and agreed to administrative subordination to the Foreign Office. (274) Despite the relative austerity, he went on to establish additional SIS offices throughout the world, offices that became key to the interwar operations Smith describes in considerable detail. At home Cumming reorganized geographically to fit the peace-time mission. He also continued the centuries-old practice of opening diplomatic mailbags, assigning the task to David Boyle in a new section. (280)

Then, in 1923, even as he was planning to retire, Mansfield Cumming died. The new C, Sinclair—the former director of naval intelligence—had been recommended by Cumming and continued—what became the tradition of using green ink and signing his name as “C.” *SIX* devotes significant attention to Sinclair’s initiatives, which began by his vigorously advocating a variation on the single intelligence service idea: he wanted MI5 and SIS consolidated, all under his control. He failed. (292–94) He was more successful in his push to strengthen station operations. He insisted on improved reporting to meet the increasing demands for intelligence on Germany, Russia, and, to a lesser extent, Japan. Smith tells of major successful efforts in collecting on the Soviet germ warfare program (296) and the German-Soviet relationship and in recruiting agents to report on the new Soviet government. (301ff)

All did not go smoothly, however, as the famous Zinoviev Letter incident illustrates. As Smith explains, SIS initially concluded that the letter advocated “armed revolution” and contained “strong incitement to contaminate the armed forces.” It was then forwarded to the Foreign Office with an endorsement stating that “the authenticity of the document is undoubted.” (306) Further investigation, however, revealed it was a fake and the Foreign Office was informed that SIS was “firmly convinced the actual thing was a forgery” as Moscow had maintained. (310) When the Foreign Office refused to believe that it was a fake, SIS reconsidered and reversed its position again. The episode did not enhance the reputation of SIS, but the organization persevered.

Smith describes several other equally embarrassing incidents, one of which resulted in a major change in the relationship of MI5 and SIS. In the 1920s, SIS was tracking Bolshevik agents in Britain. Some were connected with the All-Russian Cooperative Society (ARCOS), which was conducting espionage in Britain. SIS's own agents penetrated ARCOS and learned it possessed secret British documents. With confirming evidence collected "by the work of the GC&CS [Government Code and Cypher School] codebreakers," (315) SIS decided to raid ARCOS headquarters and get the evidence. Smith concludes the "raid itself was even more inept than the decisionmaking process that proceeded it" and produced nothing. (319) The worst was yet to come. The politicians, intent on revealing Moscow's perfidy, made public the fact they had evidence obtained by decoding Moscow's cables. The Soviets switched to one-time-pads, a major setback for SIS. Finally, an infuriated SIS was forced to give up running agents in Britain to spy on foreign enterprises. The domestic security mission was moved to MI5, where it remains today.

These failures had additional consequences. For example, when genuine German war mobilization plans were acquired in 1929 by an agent in Berlin, the prime minister suppressed distribution of the information to avoid aggravating the political situation—appeasement was preferred. (360–1) Similarly, during the 1930s when the illegal clandestine military relationship between the Russians and the Germans was detected, the Foreign Office refused to act. Even worse, reports of German submarine and aircraft construction were ignored by the Admiralty and the Royal Air Force because the information contravened existing thinking. (364–65)

Despite these and other setbacks, SIS carried on. The PCO system was expanded and a network of nonofficial cover agents was created to supply intelligence. When Sinclair could not get funds for an expansion of the GC&CS, he bought its new headquarters at Bletchley Park with his own finds and approved contacts with France and Poland to improve codebreaking capability. In the late 1930s, recognizing that war was likely, Sinclair created a an organization charged with planning sabotage operations. Guy Burgess was recruited in December 1938, as was Kim Philby in June the following year. According to Smith's account, it was Burgess who "brought [Philby] in," (378) but Philby himself refuted that claim in a report submitted to the KGB.<sup>i</sup>

*Part 1* ends just before WW II begins. Smith has documented an SIS better prepared to meet the demands of war than "is commonly believed to [have been] the case." (382) What he has also demonstrated is that SIS had acquired extensive experience, some of which it would begin passing on to its American cousins as they prepared for WW II. But that story is left to be told in the forthcoming *Part 2*.




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<sup>i</sup> See Genrikh Borovik, *The Philby Files: The Secret Life of the Master Spy – KGB Archives Revealed* (London: Little Brown, 1994), 162–63.



## ***Changgom [Long Sword]***

Hong Tong-sik (Pyongyang: Kumsong Youth Publishing House); Vol 1, published in 2005, 448 pp; Vol. 2 published in 2006, 451 pps.

**Reviewed by Stephen Mercado**

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Hong Tong-sik is a man of mystery who has written an intriguing work of historical spy fiction.<sup>a</sup> An author from a nation seen as promoting domestic culture to bolster the regime while excluding all else has written a tale sprinkled with allusions to Western authors. A writer from a repressive regime infamous for isolating its citizens from the world has authored a spy novel almost surely based on intelligence literature published in Japan and the United States. In the tale's two volumes, Hong writes of intelligence operative Chon Haeng-il, codenamed Changgom [Long Sword], and his actions against Korea's enemies. In the first volume, the hero burrows into the heart of Japanese intelligence in Manchuria to thwart an Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) campaign against Kim Il Sung, leader of the fight to liberate Koreans from Japanese rule. In the second, Chon sabotages a US Army operation to seize all of Korea and destroy the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).

Hong's fiction, as good fiction usually does, rests on many facts, in this case deployed at length and with accuracy over the period from 1940 to 1950 as the Japanese sought to expand their empire, were defeated, and gave over their country and Korea to US occupation. Atop this foundation, the author has erected a plausible plot held together with patriotic propaganda. Unlikely to be translated any time soon into English or to go on sale in Seoul, the novel nevertheless is available for purchase outside of Korea and for reading in several libraries in the United States.

### **The Mysterious Author**

Except for this work, Hong is unknown. Neither volume of this tale includes information about the author, something occasionally found in DPRK books. Nor does his name appear in the pages of the Pyongyang's *Rodong Sinmun*, Tokyo's *Choguk*, Seoul's *Minjok 21*, or any other periodical or book on North Korean literature.<sup>b</sup> The only other place Hong's name appears is as the author of a graphic novel, also titled *Changgom*, published in 2004 by a different publishing house in Pyongyang.<sup>c</sup>

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<sup>a</sup> Korean and Japanese names in this review appear in their traditional order, surname preceding given name. In writing Korean names, I am following the established McCune-Reischauer system but omitting the diacritical marks.

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*All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.*

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Although Hong lives under a regime known for strict censorship and enforced isolation, he refers in various passages to classics of global literature and writes of the world beyond his borders in far greater detail than some of his American contemporaries. In addition to citing the classic Korean tale of the virtuous maiden Chun-hyang, the author makes references to the poetry of Pushkin, the fiction of Stendhal, Shakespeare's play *Twelfth Night*, and Dumas' novel *The Count of Monte Cristo*. In its description of Japan, including its intelligence organs, Hong's story is far more detailed and accurate than that of, say, Tom Clancy's *Debt of Honor*.

Hong adds depth to his picture of Japan by mentioning landmarks, conglomerates, newspapers, historical events, and intelligence organizations. Clancy, by contrast, settled for a few tired clichés of American writers on Japan, including the defiling of fair American women by ruthless Japanese corporate executives.<sup>a</sup> Nationalism may explain why neither author portrays Japanese villains in three dimensions, but Hong adds many more details while avoiding obvious errors in Japanese expressions and names.<sup>b</sup>

Even though *Changgom* was printed by a youth publishing house, the novel reveals familiarity with foreign intelligence literature. Hong names specific IJA intelligence organs, from Second Bureau (Intelligence) of the Army General Staff in Tokyo to *tokumu kikan* (special service organs) in Manchuria. His references to US military intelligence officers in occupied Japan and Korea range from Maj. Gen. Charles Willoughby, Gen. Douglas MacArthur's G-2, to the less-known Col. Jack Canon, who operated in the shadows of occupied Japan as the director of the Canon Kikan.<sup>c</sup> Other surprising details point to specific works found in few libraries anywhere, let alone, one imagines, in Pyongyang. One character in the book, a Japanese deserter from the IJA Nakano School for spies, names the school's founding officers and piles up details about Class 1. Such facts are found in few sources, and their presence suggests that Hong read the class alumni history.<sup>d</sup> Elsewhere in the story, there are references to Lt. Col. Jay Vanderpool, who operated with Philippine guerrillas in the Second World War before arriving in Seoul, via the CIA, to direct covert military operations against Pyongyang. Hong

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<sup>b</sup> *Rodong Sinmun*, the ruling party's daily, has often run articles referring to the nation's writers. *Choguk*, a monthly magazine of the pro-Pyongyang General Association of Korean Residents in Japan, also highlights DPRK literature. The March 2006 issue, for example, includes a profile of Hong Sok-jung, whose 2002 fictional biography of a famous Korean artist of the 16th century made him in 2004 the first novelist from the DPRK to win a Seoul literary prize and later became the 2007 inter-Korean film *Hwang Jin-i*. The pro-unification Seoul monthly *Minjok 21* frequently publishes articles on Pyongyang literature.

<sup>c</sup> Pyongyang's Literature and Art Publishing House published the graphic novel *Changgom*.

<sup>a</sup> *Debt of Honor* (1994) published a year before the first volume of *Changgom*, also has Japan as the enemy of the story. Another popular tale with Japanese villains is Michael Crichton's novel *Rising Sun* (1992), a thriller with a Japanese executive's murder of his blond American lover at the center of the plot.

<sup>b</sup> *Debt of Honor*, despite the paucity of Japanese details in a novel with Japan as the enemy, includes such errors as referring to the Japanese Justice Ministry's Public Security Investigation Agency as the "Public Safety Investigation Division," calling Tokyo's landmark Okura Hotel the "Ocura," and locating Chitose, site of a Japanese military air base in Hokkaido, on the "Home Island" [sic], an incorrect reference to the main island of Honshu. Several Japanese names, and at least one Chinese man's name, are misspelled. In one of his few attempts at local color in the dialogue by the use of a Japanese word, the author misuses *dōzo*, which means "please, go ahead," to have a character say "thank you." Hong's errors are pardonable, given the notorious difficulty of deciphering Japanese names. For example, Hong identifies a founder of the Army Nakano School as "Iwaba Goyu," an understandable misreading of the Chinese characters for Maj. Gen. Iwakuro Hideo.

<sup>c</sup> Some authors have spelled Jack Canon's name "Cannon."

likely based his description of Vanderpool on such US intelligence histories as *White Tigers* or *Dark Moon*.<sup>a</sup>

Hong's knowledge of Japanese and American intelligence literature points to a man who, if not a current or retired intelligence officer, has had access to a decent library or two. If Hong were a veteran intelligence officer, he could be said to be following in the footsteps of such Western writers as Ian Fleming, Graham Greene, and John LeCarré. If he is not, work in fields like diplomacy or international trade could have given him an interest in foreign intelligence works and access to publications in the field. The dullest explanation would be that he is simply a writer who did his homework by checking out books from the Grand People's Study House, Pyongyang's counterpart to the Library of Congress.<sup>b</sup> If so, then one must assume that Pyongyang has one or more libraries whose shelves contain impressive collections of foreign works in such fields as history and politics.

### **Volume I: Thwarting Japanese Plans**

The story begins in 1940 in Japanese-occupied Korea with the conviction of Korean operative Yun Chol for treasonous activity and his dispatch, along with a former student—the book's hero, Chon Haeng-il—to Seoul's notorious Sodaemun Prison. IJA officers stage a prison break for the two, presumably in the hope they will lead them to the headquarters of Korean resistance fighters and Kim Il Sung. The two elude the Japanese but, trying to make their way to China are captured by Japanese pirates and thrown into the sea. With Yun near death, the two are fortuitously washed onto an island that serves as the pirates' lair, though they are not there. The dying Yun asks Chon to complete what had been his covert mission, to foil an IJA plan to find Kim Il Sung and destroy his hidden headquarters.

Chon gathers up pirate treasure, leaves the island, and takes on the identity of a deceased Japanese schoolmate by the name of Takashima Yoshio. By one plot twist and turn after another Chon, as Takashima, makes his way into Manchuria and burrows into the Intelligence Section of the Japanese Kwantung Army Headquarters (KAHIS), which, under Gen. Nomura Pingo,<sup>c</sup> is in charge of Operation SPHINX, the plan to do in Kim Il Sung. In this environment, Chon walks the mole's fine line between reporting on Japanese activity and exposure should Nomura come to suspect a Korean spy in his midst. At the same time, Chon must

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<sup>a</sup> Nakano Koyukai, ed. *Rikugun Nakano Gakko* (Army Nakano School). Printed in a limited edition in 1978, the book was not for commercial sale. If Hong lacked access to the alumni history, he could have found such details in a number of books on the Nakano School written in the 1960s and 1970s by the Japanese anarchist-turned-writer Hatakeyama Kiyoyuki. Such details are also found in this reviewer's own history, *The Shadow Warriors of Nakano* (2002), but Hong's errors suggest that he did not read it. His misreading the name of Maj. Gen. Iwakura strengthens the case for the author having had either direct access to Japanese intelligence literature or to Korean translations of the same.

<sup>b</sup> Col. Ben S. Malcom, with Ron Martz, *White Tigers: My Secret War in North Korea* (Washington: Brassey's, 1996). Ed Evanhoe, *Dark Moon: Eighth Army Special Operations in the Korean War* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1995).

<sup>c</sup> Journalists from a pro-Pyongyang magazine in Japan (*Choguk*, March 2006) wrote of the impressive residential library of Hong Sok-jung, the first DPRK novelist to win a literary prize in Seoul, holding "works of the world's literary masters." One can imagine that, as an approved novelist could have foreign fiction on his shelves, so someone working in diplomacy, intelligence, or some other favored position could enjoy owning or accessing foreign intelligence literature.

### **Intelligence as Portrayed in *Chang-gom***

*Corrupt Spirit:* Intelligence corrupts the spirit of those serving an unjust cause: Yamada Koichi, responsible for security in the Police Affairs Department of Japan's Government-General in Seoul, has developed a dark character over the years spent in espionage.

*Having drunk water from the muddled stream of espionage for nearly half his life, even after vomiting it back up, he had changed into nothing but a man of suspicion, wariness, and deceit.* (I:90)

*Revolutionary Spirit:* "Intelligence, corrupting those involved in injustice, is a tool for those with revolutionary spirit." The operative Yun Chol explains this to dispel the doubts of Chon Haeng-il and encourage him to undertake a covert mission:

*Revolutionaries know nothing of compromise in executing their duties. Our revolutionaries are aware that they bear responsibility until the end. Thus, there is nothing that they cannot accomplish. They form the solid foundation. Our cause is invincible. It is because we comprehend this that, facing any barrier whatsoever, we feel no pessimism. Overflowing with revolutionary optimism, we go to fight. Think of it. Who would attempt to prevail over such conviction, such spiritual power! Haeng-il, the time will surely come when you, too, realize this.* (I:99)

*Intelligence for Life:* Chon Haeng-il replies to the assertion of an American intelligence officer that he is still young enough to pursue his dream, interrupted by intelligence service, of becoming a psychologist. Chon Haeng-il suggests that only death ends the career of an intelligence operative:

*"Once you've stepped onto the swamp path of intelligence, you can never leave it for the rest of your life. Like it or not, you have to run strenuously down this "romantic," fatal path until the drawing of your last breath."* (II:56)

*Offensive CI:* The operative Hyon Myong-chin calls on Chon Haeng-il to find a way to conduct offensive counterintelligence, in this case by putting a mole in Japanese military intelligence headquarters in Manchuria to smash an Imperial Japanese Army plan to strike the Headquarters of the Revolution:

*"Our plan to act first to defeat Operation SPHINX, by penetrating the den where our enemies are plotting, is the most active and rational method. The path we are facing is none other than that one. Do your best to look for a possible way to penetrate the Kwantung Army Headquarters Intelligence Section (KAHIS). But you are absolutely not to do anything risky."* (I:220-21)

bear a long separation from his Korean fiancée while parrying the amorous advances of Nomura's smitten daughter, Yomiko.

Chon eventually does come under suspicion, however, and is imprisoned and tortured on Nomura's orders. Chon invents an explanation for the acts that had aroused suspicion, escapes the torture, and persuades Nomura to send him to Sugamo Prison in Tokyo, even as the Japanese Empire crumbles. Tokyo capitulates in August after Kim Il Sung gives his order to the Korean People's Revolutionary Army to begin a general offensive. The first volume ends in victory, with the freed hero, standing on a bank of the Sumida River in Tokyo, gazing at the blue sky in the direction of Korea saying, "Ah, Fatherland, my liberated Fatherland!"

### **Volume II: Sabotaging American Machinations**

Chon's moment of triumph ends abruptly in the second volume as US soldiers snatch him off a Tokyo street and take him to a US Army safe house where they are holding Nomura. Chon is asked to convince Nomura to turn over to Willoughby's organization a cache of Japanese intelligence documents on China, Korea, and the Soviet Union. Impressing the Americans with his bearing and his fluency in English, Korean, and Japanese, Chon soon finds himself taken into their service and sent to a secret camp outside of Chicago to assess Korean agents undergoing espionage training for covert missions in North Korea.

From Chicago, Chon is sent back to Seoul, where he learns of a US Army plan, Operation DYNAMITE, to destroy the DPRK. As he had against the Japanese, he undertakes a secret effort to foil the scheme. The many plot twists include having to keep his distance from his fiancée, now running a bar catering to South Korean intelligence officers working for the Americans. Appearing at times are other Korean characters from the first volume. These include a disgraced newspaper editor and a pathetic intelligence collaborator abused and betrayed by his successive Japanese and American masters. In the end, Chon and his network manage to keep Pyongyang one step ahead of the US Army. In the end, Chon

◦ Nomura's given name is an example of Hong's difficulty with Japanese. The "ping" in "Pingo" likely comes from the Korean reading for 須 , a common character for Japanese names; the "o," a common ending in a man's surname, should be 雄 , 夫 or 男 . The correct reading for the general's name would be Nomura Nagao. This mistake suggests that Hong has a feel for Japanese culture but a shaky grasp of the language.

suffers the loss of his fiancée, who dies to save him, and he escapes to the North on the eve of the outbreak of the Korean War with her brother, a man of shifting appearances who, in the final scene, reveals his true identity as a fellow DPRK operative.

### Fiction Resting on Fact

Hong has constructed his story on details of historical events that occurred during the period 1940–50. These include, among many others, the IJA advance into French Indochina in 1940; Lt. Gen. John Hodge's instructions in 1945 banning Korean political organizations; the use of Japanese soldiers under Gen. Abe Nobuyuki to keep order in the US-occupied portion of Korea; the shuttering of the Korean Communist Party organ, *Haebang Ilbo*; and other acts that destroyed the legal left in Seoul before the establishment of the Republic of Korea in 1948.<sup>a</sup>

Particulars of intelligence work depicted in the novel also rest on facts. In colonial Seoul, for example, Chon and a fellow Korean operative choose to meet in secret among the trees of Changchundan Park. The site was, in fact, a rendezvous for spies, according to the memoir of a Japanese police intelligence officer stationed in Seoul who recalled surprise at catching Soviet Consul-General Alexander Poliansky in the park with a Korean agent.<sup>b</sup> Another example is the fictional character Nomura, who is clearly based in part on Lt. Gen. Arisue Seizo, the IJA's last intelligence chief, who turned over the IJA Second Bureau's files on the Soviet Union, China, and other subjects to US Army intelligence as part of a Japanese effort soon after the war to forge an alliance with the United States.<sup>c</sup>

### Availability

As with many works of North Korean literature, Beijing and Tokyo book vendors stock *Changgom*. The

<sup>a</sup> On US military government policy in occupied Korea (1945–1948), see Kim Chang-yun, *Migunjonggi chianjongchaek yongu* [A Study of the Security Policy of the US Military Government in Korea]. No. 33 (2008), *Hanguk Kongan Haengjong Hakhoebo* [Bulletin of the Korean Association of Public Safety and Criminal Justice], <http://ka-pc.or.kr/books/33/1.pdf>.

<sup>b</sup> Tsuboi Sachio, with Araki Nobuko, *Aru Chosen Sotokufu keisatsukan no kaiso* [Memoir of a Police Official of the Korean Government-General Office] (Tokyo: Soshisha, 2004), 114–15.

<sup>c</sup> Arisue, who formed his own Arisue Kikan to work early in the occupation with General MacArthur's G-2, wrote at length about his activities in a number of memoirs, including *Arisue Kikancho no shuki: Shusen Hishi* [Memoir of the Chief of the Arisue Kikan: Secret History of the War's End] (Tokyo: Fuyo Shobo Shuppan, 1987).

*OSINT*: Japanese police intelligence officer Yamada Koichi in Seoul blackmails Mun Yong-Chon, chief editor of the Korean newspaper *Donga Ilbo*, into covertly working for him by threatening to turn him over to the Japanese military's dreaded Kempeitai for publishing a newspaper article on a Japanese organization spying in Manchuria under cover as a joint venture company. Yamada suggests to Mun that a great deal of intelligence makes its way into open sources:

*"To date, 60 percent of leaked political, economic, and military secrets have flowed out through articles you all have written. In light of this, it is no accident that we take an interest in journalists."* (I:92)

*Radio Deception*: Fellow operative Nam Su-kil informs Chon Haeng-il that the Americans have broken the code for radio instructions from headquarters. Chon replies that they will use this breach in communications security to deceive the enemy:

*"They're not fools. So I think it would be better to continue broadcasting from Headquarters in that code."*

*Confused*, Nam Su-kil raised his head sharply and looked at Haeng-il. Then, seeing the smile that lit Haeng-il's gaze, he suddenly grasped his meaning.

*"We'll feed them disinformation."*

*"Right. We'll have to confound them. Both those guys and I will receive the broadcast instructions. As for interpreting those instructions, we're going to do so the opposite way they do. Hitting our mark there, if we devise our tactics well, we can really make them suffer."* (II:320)

*Summation*: As Chon Haeng-il makes his way from South Korea to headquarters with a fellow operative, the United States and their Korean puppets in Seoul start the Korean War on 25 June 1950. The Korean People's Army counterattacks, liberating Seoul in only three days. The narrative links the efforts of the novel's hero, whose code name is Long Sword [Changgom], to the past fight against Tokyo and the ongoing struggle against Washington and Seoul:

*The spirit of the resourceful Korean People's Army units soared to the sky.*

*Truly, it was a stirring reality.*

*This is indeed the mettle of Korea.*

*Yesterday, we brought down the flashing blade of Korea's long sword upon the heads of the Japanese imperialist villains. Today, we bring down in a flash that powerful long sword of Korea upon the heads of the US imperialist villains and their running dogs.* (II:451)



Beijing Sunyong Scientific Technology Trade Company offers both volumes on its “Korean Publication” Web site for a combined price of EUR 15.50. The first volume of Hong’s earlier graphic novel goes for EUR 1.60.<sup>a</sup> In Tokyo, fans of spy fiction can find both volumes of the novel for ¥2,800 yen at the Korea Book Center, a store run by the pro-Pyongyang General Association of Korean Residents in Japan.<sup>b</sup> In the United States, copies are available at the Library of Congress as well as in the libraries of Columbia University, Harvard University, the University of Chicago, and the University of Michigan.



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<sup>a</sup> The Beijing vendor’s Web page is at [www.dprk-book.com](http://www.dprk-book.com).

<sup>b</sup> Korea Book Center’s Web page is at [www.krbook.net](http://www.krbook.net). The pro-Pyongyang association is more commonly known by its Japanese name, Chosen Soren.

## ***Stalin's Romeo Spy***

Emil Draitser (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2010), 420 pp., end notes, bibliography, index.

**Reviewed by John Ehrman**

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Writing the biography of a spy must be frustrating work. To be interesting, the subject needs to have been involved in the types of daring operations that are the stuff of fiction. But separating truth from exaggeration, or outright falsehood, without complete records or interviews with others is almost impossible. The result can be a book that is interesting, even fascinating in places, but of uncertain reliability. So it is with Emil Draitser's biography of the great Soviet spy Dmitri Bystrolyotov, *Stalin's Romeo Spy*. It is a book that is captivating and, although flawed, worthwhile.

Few have heard of Bystrolyotov, even though he was one of the most important Soviet illegals active between the First and Second World Wars. Born out of wedlock in 1901 to a socially rebellious mother, Bystrolyotov came of age during the chaos of the Russian Revolution and civil war, as well as the post-WW I upheavals in Eastern and Central Europe. His education was spotty, but Bystrolyotov was blessed with the ability to learn languages and to think on his feet. After a series of adventures on the margins of society, Bystrolyotov became a communist and, winding up in Prague in the mid-1920s, began working for Soviet intelligence. Although he was never formally trained or appointed, Bystrolyotov became one of Moscow's premier illegals. He crisscrossed Europe, often posing as an East European aristocrat, recruiting and running French, British, German, and Italian spies. Bystrolyotov specialized in obtaining codes from West European embassies, thus giving Moscow access to diplomatic traffic. One of his assets was Ernest Oldham, the British cipher clerk who sold him London's diplomatic codes. Bystrolyotov also often used his extraordinary good looks and charm to seduce embassy secretaries and lonely female officials who could help him gain access to codes and other information.

After more than a decade of frenetic work in Europe, Bystrolyotov was recalled to Moscow. Soon after, in 1938, he was swept up in Stalin's Terror. Arrested on trumped-up charges and brutally beaten until he confessed to espionage, terrorism, and various counterrevolutionary activities, Bystrolyotov was sent to the Gulag. He did not emerge until 1954, after years of barbaric conditions and treatment had ruined his health. He spent the remainder of his life working as a translator, seeking recognition of his service from the KGB, and writing memoirs of his years abroad and in the camps. After his death in 1975, the KGB (subsequently the SVR) memorialized him as one of its heroes, although it publicized only a whitewashed version of his life.

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*Stalin's Romeo Spy* is a good book about espionage and life at the working level in Stalin's intelligence services. A journalist as well as an academic and the writer of a large number of fiction and nonfiction works, Draitser tells a good story, knows how to bring characters and situations to life, and moves the tale along quickly enough to keep readers interested. Unlike in many other biographies of spies, there is little padding. Draitser assumes his readers are familiar with the politics and history of interwar Europe and the Soviet Union and does not go into long explanations of events. He also avoids excusing Bystrolyotov's amoral behavior, which at times, Draitser rightly says, descended into the sociopathic.

Draitser is uniquely qualified to write this biography. Draitser was born in the USSR, where he met Bystrolyotov as an old man and where he interviewed him and was given access to his papers. After immigrating to the United States in 1974, Draitser earned a PhD from UCLA in Slavic Languages and Literatures. In his years in the United States, he has produced an impressive collection of published works. He now teaches at Hunter College in New York City. Draitser's work on this biography—and indeed his collection of published material—reveal him to be a conscientious scholar and researcher. For this book, he seems to have mined the available sources—including declassified KGB files—thoroughly. But, as Draitser acknowledges, the Russian files are incomplete, and he often has to rely on either his interviews with Bystrolyotov or the retired spy's memoirs to tell his story.

As an example of historical and intelligence scholarship, therefore, *Stalin's Romeo Spy* needs to be read with a careful, critical eye. First, it is not clear that Bystrolyotov's versions of events are reliable. One wonders if the old illegal charmed Draitser into believing some improbable stories. For example, Bystrolyotov told of his work in the Gulag as a camp medic, a position he claimed to have obtained he had attended medical school in Zurich. Nowhere in the 150 pages Draitser devoted to Bystrolyotov's time in Europe does he mention such schooling. Moreover, there is the question of how a spy as busy as Bystrolyotov would have had the time to go to medical school. In another instance, Draitser describes how Bystrolyotov carried out sophisticated medical research in a makeshift camp laboratory—an implausible story told without supporting source notes.

Draitser also has an unfortunate tendency to fall into psychological speculation. Bystrolyotov, to be sure, is a good subject for this—his mother was neglectful, he spun fantasies about his father's identity, and he seems to have had few qualms about how he treated the women he bedded in his espionage work. Bystrolyotov's personal love life also was bizarre. In Europe, Bystrolyotov said he fell in love with a woman who turned out to be a lesbian, eventually married her lover, may have later murdered his original love and then, to top it all off, sent his wife to become the lover of a French intelligence officer so he could gain access to the Frenchman's papers. But Draitser's explanations of Bystrolyotov's makeup sound forced, such as when he attributes the spy's actions to "bottled-up, suppressed hostility...[and the] result of the absence of a consistent value-conveying figure" that led him to develop the "elements of a sociopathic personality free of guilt" (24–25). It is as if Draitser felt a need to explain Bystrolyotov's personal-

ity but just could not quite get a grip on the man. Psychological analysis of a subject so far removed in time and distance is chancy, even for a professional analyst, let alone someone unschooled in the field, and Draitser might have done better to avoid the attempt.

The analysis is doubly unfortunate because, in looking for what made Bystrolyotov unique, Draitser missed the opportunity to compare him to other illegals and draw out their commonalities. It would seem, in fact, that there is something about illegals that leads them to unusual behavior. Perhaps a personality that is willing and able to live for long periods under a completely false identity is one that will conclude there are no bounds on their behavior; or, perhaps, illegals conclude that having a disposable identity permits them to indulge in otherwise forbidden behaviors. In this context, it is worth noting, Bystrolyotov's sexual escapades seem not be too unusual among illegals. Wolfgang Lutz, the Israeli illegal active in Egypt in the 1960s, related in his memoirs the charming story of how he met a woman on a train in Europe and, after a whirlwind romance, married her and brought her to Cairo to be his partner in espionage; however, he neglected to tell her that he already had a wife and son living in Paris. A decade later in the United States, the Koechers—a husband-and-wife pair of Czech illegals—also had many sexual adventures in the course of their work. More recently, apparently, so did Anna Chapman, one of the ten Russian illegals arrested in the United States in June 2010.

Draitser also overlooks another way in which Bystrolyotov was similar to many other spies of his era. Like Whittaker Chambers, he emerged from a troubled personal background and then reacted to the uncertainties of the post-WW I era by turning to communism and espionage. Teodor Maly, who recruited Kim Philby, also remained a loyal communist, to the point that he accepted a summons back to Moscow, fully expecting to be executed. Indeed, while Bystrolyotov's experiences gradually made him doubt the Soviet system, he never quite broke with it. It may be indicative of Bystrolyotov's ability to project his version of events that Draitser did not venture to ask why such a clever and educated man remained loyal to the system that used and then tortured him.

Despite its weaknesses, *Stalin's Romeo Spy* deserves the attention of anyone interested in the history of the Soviet intelligence services or the history of intelligence in general. Draitser's account reminds us of the feats of espionage the Soviet services were able to accomplish when they set aside all scruples. Given that human nature is changeless and that ruthless regimes still remain in the world—not to mention that we now know conclusively that Moscow continues to use illegals against us—the book is a reminder of what we need to watch for.





# The Intelligence Officer's Bookshelf

Compiled and Reviewed by Hayden B. Peake

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## **Current Topics**

***Cyber War: The Next Threat to National Security and What To Do About It*** by

Richard A. Clarke and Robert K. Knake

***Intelligence and Human Rights in the Era of Global Terrorism*** by Steve Tsang

(ed.)

***Intelligence Issues and Developments*** by Terrance M. Paulson (ed.)

***The Intelligence Wars: Lessons from Baghdad*** by Steven K. O'Hern

***Peddling Peril: How the Secret Nuclear Trade Arms America's Enemies*** by

David Albright

***A World Of Trouble: The White House and the Middle East—From the Cold***

***War to the War on Terror*** by Patrick Tyler

## **General**

***Handbook of Scientific Methods of Inquiry for Intelligence Analysis*** by Hank Prunckum

***Handbook of Warning Intelligence: Assessing the Threat to National Security***  
by Cynthia Grabo

***Intelligence Analysis: How To Think In Complex Environments*** by Wayne Michael Hall and Gary Citrenbaum

***Intelligence Analysis: A Target-Centric Approach***, 3rd Edition, by Robert M. Clark

***Intelligence Research and Analysis: An Introduction*** by Jerome Claurer

***National Intelligence Systems: Current Research and Future Prospects*** by Gregory F. Treverton and Wilhelm Agrell (eds.)

## **Memoir**

***KH601: "And Ye Shall Know the Truth and the Truth Shall Make You Free," My Life in the Central Intelligence Agency*** by Richard G. Irwin

***The Reluctant Spy: My Secret Life With the CIA's War on Terror*** by John Kiria-kou with Michael Ruby

***A Woman's War: The Professional and Personal Journey of the Navy's First African American Female Intelligence Officer*** by Gail Harris with Pam McLaughlin

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**Historical**

***Anthropological Intelligence: The Deployment and Neglect of American Anthropology in the Second World War*** by David H. Price

***Arabian Knight: Colonel Bill Eddy USMC and the Rise of American Power in the Middle East*** by Thomas W. Lippman

***The Black Bats: CIA Spy Flights over China from Taiwan, 1951–1969*** by Chris Pocock, and Clarence Fu

***Cavalier & Roundhead Spies: Intelligence in the Civil War and Commonwealth*** by Julian Whitehead

***Deathly Deception: The Real Story of Operation Mincemeat*** by Denis Smyth

***Dilly: The Man Who Broke Enigma*** by Mavis Batey

***England's Greatest Spy: Eamon de Valera*** by John J. Tur

***Hunting Evil: The Nazi War Criminals Who Escaped and the Hunt to Bring them to Justice*** by Guy Walters

***Iran and the CIA: The Fall of Mosaddeq Revisited*** by Darioush Bayandor

***Shadows On The Mountains: The Allies, the Resistance, and the Rivalries That Doomed WWII Yugoslavia*** by Marcia Christoff Kurapovna

***T-FORCE: The Race For Nazi War Secrets, 1945*** by Sean Longden

***The World that Never Was: A True Story of Dreamers, Schemers, Anarchists, and Secret Agents*** by Alex Butterworth

**Intelligence Services Abroad**

***The Entity: Five Centuries of Secret Vatican Espionage*** by Eric Frattini

***The Family File*** by Mark Aarons

***Military Intelligence in Cyprus: From the Great War to the Middle East Crisis*** by Panagiotis Dimitrakis

***Mossad Exodus: The Daring Undercover Rescue of the Last Jewish Tribe*** by Gad Shimron

**Fiction**

***The Caliphate*** by Andre Le Gallo



## ***Current Topics***

***Cyber War: The Next Threat to National Security and What to Do About It***  
 by Richard A. Clarke and Robert K. Knake. New York: HarperCollins, 2010, 290 pp., glossary, no index.

Cyber war as defined in this book refers to “actions by a nation-state to penetrate another nation’s computers or networks for the purpose of causing damage or disruption.” (6) The authors argue that because the United States enjoys a substantial advantage in cyber technology throughout its infrastructure, US systems are bigger targets and in greater jeopardy than those of any other nation. Put another way, it is a sobering fact that neither civilian entities nor the military could function without the Internet.

As with other forms of warfare, cyber war has offensive and defensive components. Militarily, the authors give the United States and Israel high marks for offensive cyber warfare capabilities. The attack on the Syrian nuclear facility in 2007 during which the Israelis neutralized Syrian air-defense computers is used to illustrate cyber war reality. To strengthen the argument, cyber attacks against Estonia, Georgia, and South Korea are examined in considerable detail.

On the defensive side, the authors note, the US Cyber Command was established to protect Defense Department systems. Likewise, on the civilian side, the Department of Homeland Security is responsible for measures to defend against cyber attack on government facilities. The authors argue at length, however, that a gap remains: US business and commercial networks. Oil refineries, air-traffic-control systems, banking networks, and the electric power grid are vulnerable to logic bombs—programs placed in a computer network to be activated later to destroy its functions—and other malicious software that could render the Internet impotent and devastate the economy.

*Cyber War* suggests the main threat comes from a potential conflict with China and Russia, since both have sophisticated cyber warfare capabilities, although smaller nations—North Korea—and even hackers are a problem. A number of preventive measures to minimize the likelihood of cyber attacks are discussed. These include international treaties to ban cyber war against civilian infrastructures, a “no first-use” pledge, plus national and international regulatory mechanisms. Interestingly, the authors do not recommend an attempt to eliminate cyber espionage since it can have positive effects and can’t be stopped anyway.

Richard Clarke’s national security experience under four presidents gives him insights to this problem. Robert Knake, a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, adds the perspective of youth. Together they have attempted to alert the public to a potential doomsday scenario. But by not offering source notes, the authors leave the reader wondering whether the problem is as serious as they suggest. Is there more to the story?

***Intelligence and Human Rights in the Era of Global Terrorism*** by Steve Tsang (ed.). Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007, 224 pp., end-notes, index.

How can the West overcome the worldwide terrorist threat while protecting civil liberties and human rights? Steve Tsang, a former dean of St. Antony's College, Oxford, has assembled 13 papers that address various parts of the answer. The authors are senior academics and government officials—retired and active—from six Western nations; all have considerable experience thinking about and, in some cases, dealing with terrorism. War and “immoral” operations, they suggest, are not the answer; good intelligence, however, is a basic requirement.

The authors dwell heavily on what must be done to combat terrorists. “Intelligence organizations must work with their governments...to remove the wider social, religious, economic, and ethnic conditions that enable groups like al Qaeda...to entrench and regenerate themselves by recruiting new generations of leaders, agents, and suicide bombers.” Of equal importance is the need for democratic governments and intelligence communities “not to lose credibility and confidence among their own citizens” as they deal with the threat. (6)

British journalist Mark Urban suggests the need for “greater transparency” to create understanding among the public—“greater specificity about terrorist or weapons of mass destruction threats.” (24) Several authors discuss improvements needed—especially oversight, legal frameworks, better assessment, and budgetary procedures—in the US, British, Israeli, and German intelligence communities. Oxford academic Alex Danchev devotes a chapter to the “human intelligence” problems created by Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay. Professor Anthony Glees writes about needed reforms in the British intelligence and security services. Professor Richard Aldrich comments on the necessity for setting priorities in a world of continuing and shifting threats “as intelligence services struggle to address globalization,” (163) suggesting that the changes already made “are not radical enough.” (168)

While the articles are strong on what needs to be done in general, the question raised at the outset is not answered directly. Moreover, the authors do not seem to recognize that the intelligence services are themselves well acquainted with the problems and have implemented solutions. The recommendations made may indeed improve public understanding, but whether they are really addressing a problem that is already solved is not considered.

***Intelligence Issues and Developments*** by Terrance M. Paulson (ed.). Hauppauge, NY: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 2008, 177 pp., end of chapter notes, index.

Nova Science Publishers specializes in reprinting—and sometimes portraying as fresh work—material that is available in the public domain, often at no cost. This collection contains eight chapters, each of which is an excerpt from a congressional research report. Thus they provide indications of what

is furnished to the intelligence oversight committees of Congress. Topics the chapters cover include proposals for changes to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and the role of the director of national intelligence (DNI). One chapter includes a study on the use of the polygraph in the Department of Energy—in response to congressionally mandated changes after 9/11. The study shows why this counterintelligence tool is controversial. The price of ignoring open source intelligence (OSINT) is illustrated in a report on India's nuclear tests in the 1990s. A chapter on national intelligence estimates asks: "How Useful to Congress?" The final chapter discusses whether DOD counterintelligence operations encroach on CIA's covert action mission.

This book may be of value as a "one-stop" introduction for readers new to these subjects, since congressional research reports are not made directly available to the public. But the editor's stated intent, to present "new in-depth analyses of developments in the field" of intelligence in the "21st century environment," is too ambitious. The commentary on developments is thin, more descriptive than analytical, and many topics—budgets and contractors, to name two—are omitted. For real depth, further reading is essential—no bibliography is provided. Google would be the place to start.

***The Intelligence Wars: Lessons from Baghdad*** by Steven K. O'Hern.  
Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2008, 292 pp., index.

Air Force Col. Steven O'Hern was not prepared to battle an insurgency when he was sent to Iraq to command a joint counterintelligence unit in 2005. His experience convinced him that the "nation's intelligence community does not work well against an insurgency." *The Intelligence Wars* summarizes the problems he identified—personnel, doctrinal, bureaucratic, and operational—and suggests some solutions.

The distinguishing characteristic of the current insurgency or fourth generation warfare (4GW), as O'Hern calls it, is that "it seeks to convince our leaders that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly." He suggests there are no technology fixes to prevent or defeat this kind of warfare, though technology can help. The solution, he writes, is improved HUMINT. About half the book is devoted to explaining what changes are necessary and how they should work.

There are chapters on recruiting and handling, interrogations, the demand for translators, the role of contractors and problems of "stove piping." (20–27ff) After recognizing the many units engaged in HUMINT at all levels and considering the need for coordinated operations, he concludes by suggesting "a counterinsurgency supremo" may be required. (272)

There is no way to tell from the instances O'Hern provides whether that is the right approach. There may well be alternatives. His particular solution aside, *The Intelligence Wars* does make a very strong case for an improved HUMINT counterinsurgency program now.

**Peddling Peril: How the Secret Nuclear Trade Arms America's Enemies** by David Albright. New York: Free Press, 2010, 295 pp., endnotes, index.

Several books have covered the story of A.Q. Khan and how he made millions selling atomic secrets and hardware to Iran, North Korea, and Libya while helping Pakistan become a nuclear power.<sup>1</sup> David Albright, a journalist and former UN nuclear inspector, updates the previous works as he argues that trade in nuclear weapons continues. In one chapter he looks at CIA and MI6 roles in ending Libya's bid to become a nuclear power and in bringing down Khan's network with the cooperation of other nations. Curiously though, Albright mentions fewer participants than the earlier accounts. The book also discusses court actions taken and not taken against the principals in several countries—no one wanted to prosecute; this part adds new material. Albright's sources include unnamed confidential informants and various media and court documents, but the reader is left to trust his word in many cases. *Peddling Peril* is a good summary, but not definitive.

**A World Of Trouble: The White House and the Middle East—from the Cold War to the War on Terror** by Patrick Tyler. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009, 628 pp., endnotes, photos, index.

Each post-WW II US president has had to deal with problems in the Middle East. *A World Of Trouble* chronicles the “foreseeable diplomatic blunders” of successive administrations. The primary emphasis is on the Arab-Israeli conflict, but relationships with Egypt, Lebanon, Iran, Iraq, and, eventually, al Qaeda are discussed. Eisenhower comes off the best; his successors are poor seconds. To varying degrees, the CIA played a role in each adventure. The CIA role in the 1953 coup in Iran is mentioned but without much detail. William Casey's contributions to the Iran-Contra affair under President Reagan are covered in detail. Several incidents during the Clinton administration receive attention; the account of the efforts of CIA officer Robert Baer to bring down Saddam Hussein in the mid-1990s includes new information. Likewise, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's attempts to link Jonathan Pollard's release to an Arab-Israeli peace agreement are dealt with at length, as is George Tenet's reaction when Netanyahu leaked to the Israeli press that he was “coming home” with Pollard. (493) The circumstances surrounding the Iraq war in 2003 are reviewed but nothing new is added. Tyler notes that an “impressive CIA-produced video” was used to make the case for the Israeli bombing in 2007 of the nuclear facility in Syria, (551) but he concludes that since the intelligence was available before the attack a more prudent course would have been to present the evidence to the UN and perhaps avoid the bombing. Whatever the truth on the diplomatic side, *A World Of Trouble* makes clear the necessity for good intelligence in dealing with the Middle East conflict.

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<sup>1</sup> Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark, *Deception: Pakistan, the United States, and the Secret Trade in Nuclear Weapons* (New York: Walker & Company, 2007); Douglas Frantz and Catherine Collins, *The Nuclear Jihadist: The True Story of the Man Who Sold the World's Most Dangerous Secrets... and How We Could Have Stopped Him* (New York: Twelve, 2007); David Armstrong and Joseph Trento, *America and the Islamic Bomb: The Deadly Compromise* (Hanover, NH: Steerforth Press, 2007).

## General

***Handbook of Warning Intelligence: Assessing the Threat to National Security*** by Cynthia Grabo. Lanham, MD: The Scarecrow Press, 2010, 306 pp., no index.

Cynthia Grabo wrote the original manuscript for this book on her own time toward the end of her career at DIA. When she submitted the 700-page volume to her masters, it was confiscated and classified secret. She didn't keep a copy. DIA published a three-volume classified version and released it in 1972 and 1974. In 2002, an abridged, unclassified version was published under the title *Anticipating Surprise*. The edition discussed here contains the first two of the three volumes; the third remains classified for some reason. In the foreword, former National Defense Intelligence College professor Jan Goldman writes that few books describe "how to do intelligence." (xiv) Although Goldman implies that this is among the few, this book really is not. Instead, it describes the kinds of things intelligence analysts should look for, but not how to go about doing the job. Not a single specific example is given.

There are other weaknesses. The author explains she saw the invasion of Czechoslovakia coming and couldn't get anyone to listen. But she gives no details to support her argument or how she presented it. In the chapter on what makes a good analyst, the attributes of subject knowledge and language ability are omitted. When speaking about political warning factors, she finds them more susceptible to deception than military ones, but once again she gives no examples and cites no sources. Her contention that "the perception of enemy intentions is essentially a political judgment" (177) is easily refuted by any competent military commander. As to deception, at the time of her writing she found it the least understood factor of the warning problem. But even in 1972 that was incorrect, and it certainly is now as Thaddeus Holt's book, *The Deceivers*, makes clear. The book, in short, is out of date and needs source citations and practical examples.

***Intelligence Analysis: How to Think in Complex Environments*** by Wayne Michael Hall and Gary Citrenbaum. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC Clio, 2009, 440 pp., endnotes, bibliography, index.

***Handbook of Scientific Methods of Inquiry for Intelligence Analysis*** by Hank Prunckun. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2010, 233 pp., end of chapter notes, photos, index.

***Intelligence Analysis: A Target-Centric Approach***, 3rd Edition, by Robert M. Clark. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2010, 338 pp., end of chapter notes, index.

***Intelligence Research and Analysis: An Introduction*** by Jerome Clauser. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2008, 218 pp., end of chapter notes, index.

Each of the four books above has the objective of helping the intelligence analyst get it right by offering scientific methods to resolve intelligence problems. The authors of *Intelligence Analysis: How to Think in Complex Environ-*

ments devote chapters to the following techniques of “advanced analysis”: decomposition, critical thinking, link, pattern, trend, anticipatory, cultural, anomaly, semiotics, aggregation, recomposition, synthesis, and technology. It ends with some ideas on a system of thought. A reader should be wary of a major weakness of this book; it is written in advanced Pentagonese. The following example is unfortunately typical: “Recomposition is a cognition—and machine—driven compilation and recompilation of parts, components, basic elements, and data to gain insight, information, knowledge and understanding of the whole.” (299) Summing up, “It is with recomposition that the important bridge between seemingly meaningless data (zeros and ones) becomes meaningful.” (312) There is an even more serious limitation to consider. There are no examples demonstrating that the techniques described actually work. They authors discuss only what should be done. Certainly not for a beginner.

The second book, by Australian professor Hank Prunckun, who teaches criminal intelligence at Charles Sturt University is more of a general primer. In 15 chapters it reviews the basics of intelligence, the research process, use of covert sources, basic statistics, presentation and reporting, and some advanced techniques. There is a separate chapter on techniques for analyzing counterterrorism and another for ethical considerations. But Prunckun too falls short when it comes to illustrating how techniques work. For instance, he notes that “force field analysis can be carried out to weigh the possible success of a planned operation.” (139) But he gives no examples that show how to do it, any indication that it has ever been successful, or the criteria for selecting a particular technique.

*Intelligence Analysis: A Target-Centric Approach*, contains Robert Clark's latest thinking on the subject. He has designed a system intended to ensure sharing of information and analytic objectivity while enhancing the chances a decision maker will act on and not ignore a product. The target-centric approach is a collaborative method that uses analytic techniques needed to solve the problem. The techniques are discussed in three parts containing 15 chapters. Part 1 introduces target-centric analysis. Part 2 considers modeling, and Part 3—more than half the book—describes the techniques of predictive analysis. He includes many diagrams and charts to illustrate his points, but like the books mentioned above, one is left asking which technique works, when should one be used as opposed to another, how is a given technique applied, etc. Clark discusses the value of case-based reasoning but his illustrations (201–2) clarify little. Thus, one is left wondering just how the various approaches discussed are actually applied to a real-world situation, or whether they have ever been applied successfully.

The revised edition of Clauser's *Intelligence Research and Analysis*, like Prunckun's book, is an introductory text and covers basic techniques. It is the only one, however, to give a real-world example of how the techniques and methods discussed are applied. The author points out that his example is not given as a recommended approach but just to show how an actual study—in this case using open sources—was performed and the results achieved. One might wish it were more detailed, but at least it is a start.

**National Intelligence Systems: Current Research and Future Prospects** by Gregory F. Treverton and Wilhelm Agrell (eds.). New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009, 294 pp., footnotes, index.

This book was sponsored by the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency in 2008. It examines the state of research on intelligence and considers where additional research might enrich understanding and practice of the subject. The first of three parts examines the nebulous field of intelligence theory but does not explain why theory is needed. Nor does the book explain why current explanations—the kind most professionals would provide—are not good enough. Treverton and Agrell do offer some interesting thoughts on intelligence after the Cold War, looking at why it did not do well after the war on terrorism began. The second part looks at post-9/11 technical intelligence and the relationship of counterterrorism and intelligence. In the latter case, after considering the threat and requirements, there is a discussion of metrics, a topic not often mentioned in intelligence literature.

The third part examines the relationship between intelligence and the policy- or decision maker, oversight from a German perspective (210ff), and the nature of any limits when dealing with secret intelligence in “the age of public scrutiny.” (235ff) The final chapter deals with the question of whether intelligence is a profession. It allows that there are intelligence professionals but not necessarily an intelligence profession. It also acknowledges that a theory of intelligence would be of more value to academics than to practitioners, although why this is so is not immediately obvious. The contributors, both academics and former professional intelligence officers, come from a number of Western countries. They have made a thoughtful contribution that illustrates the extent to which intelligence in international relations today has changed.

### ***Memoir***

***KH601: “And Ye Shall Know the Truth and the Truth Shall Make You Free,” My Life in the Central Intelligence Agency*** by Richard G. Irwin. Herndon, VA: Fortis Publishing, 2010, 363 pp., photos, glossary, no index.

In pursuit of a boyhood dream to become a Pennsylvania state trooper, Richard Irwin submitted his application when he was a junior in college. He was rejected. Then he saw an advertisement for CIA officers and, relying on his experience as a construction worker, bouncer, bartender, and security guard, he submitted an application. He was rejected. But this time the door of opportunity was not shut completely; he was offered the chance to become a contract CIA security guard with the possibility of staff employment in the future. He accepted. After a 28-year career, with assignments in the Office of Security, the Directorate of Science and Technology, the Directorate of Operations, the White House, and the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Irwin retired and wrote *KH601*.

The book tells his story of life overseas, with adventures in Latin America, Europe, and at Headquarters, during which he visited 87 countries while rais-

ing a family. He covers his training, his duties on the DCI security staff, his realization that work as an analyst was not for him, and a special assignment in Africa to conduct a personal protection survey. In Latin America he worked against insurgents and in Europe on the counternarcotics program. His final overseas tour was in Afghanistan, where he implemented security measures at various locations.

Irwin's career was not without its bumps, which he describes with candor, but he ended as a senior manager during assignments at the White House and DHS. *KH601* shows the importance of motivation and what can be achieved when one is willing to start at the bottom and work hard.

***The Reluctant Spy: My Secret Life in the CIA's War on Terror*** by John Kiriakou, with Michael Ruby. New York: Bantam, 2009, 224 pp., index.

John Kiriakou was recruited as an analyst by the CIA out of George Washington University in 1990. He later became a case officer, but that career move was not a reluctant choice, as the title suggests. The reluctance surfaced gradually as he realized the negative impact his life in the field would have on his marriage and family. The substance of the book, however, concerns his training, the importance of knowing foreign languages—Arabic and Greek—his service in Pakistan, the capture of Abu Zubaydah, and his views on torture that surfaced publicly after he resigned. He also tells of his tour in Greece, working against terrorist groups, and at Headquarters, where he encountered the management conflicts that led to his departure. For prospective intelligence officers, he gives a realistic picture of the challenges and opportunities one can expect with the right skills and motivation. As former senior CIA officer Bruce Riedel writes in the preface, “Any American who wants to know what it is really like to work as an intelligence officer in the CIA should start here.”

***A Woman's War: The Professional and Personal Journey of the Navy's First African American Female Intelligence Officer*** by Gail Harris with Pam McLaughlin. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2010, 278 pp., end of chapter notes, no index.

When Gail Harris watched actor Don Ameche give an intelligence briefing to his carrier pilots in the movie *Wing and a Prayer* she decided that was what she wanted to do in life. She was 5 years old. Before she was 60, she was a US Navy captain. *A Woman's War* tells how she did it.

After graduating from Drew University and Navy Officer Candidate School, Harris was accepted for intelligence training—as a test case. She would be the first African American female officer in each of her subsequent assignments. *A Woman's War* is roughly chronological—there are occasional topical digressions—and describes her career with considerable candor. Told by an intelligence instructor, in front of the class, that she did not “belong in the Navy, let alone in a squadron,” (13) she responded with a wisecrack that shut him up and won her class's respect. The constant thread of her story is hard work and doing her job well.

While serving in a variety of assignments all over the world, Harris overcame a number of potentially career ending obstacles: Graves disease (a thyroid condition), depression, a persistent weight problem, a “wild child drunken playgirl reputation,” (135) being passed over for promotion to commander, and an investigation for security violations. She treated them as speed bumps. Her solutions make inspiring reading.

Her groundbreaking assignments included a war-gaming tour at the Naval War College, where she declined an offer to join the CIA; work at the naval component of CENTCOM; service as acting naval attaché in Egypt; a tour at the Strategic Air Command, where she managed a staff of 500; and the Space Command in Colorado Springs, where she learned the potential threats posed by cyber warfare.

Captain Harris concludes her memoir with a chapter on lessons she learned as a black woman and her views on intelligence as a profession. (258ff) *A Woman's War* is an inspirational story for career intelligence professionals in general and for African American women in particular. A really valuable contribution to the intelligence literature.

### ***Historical***

***Anthropological Intelligence: The Deployment and Neglect of American Anthropology in the Second World War*** by David H. Price. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008), 370 pp., endnotes, bibliography, index.

Author and anthropologist David Price has a problem. He can justify anthropologists participating in WW II against fascism, but applying the science to “CIA's efforts to achieve global hegemony” is an entirely different matter. What this scientist avoids is any evidence that the CIA has hegemonic objectives or that anthropological techniques would be a factor if it did. These nuances aside, the bulk of the book is devoted to the uses of anthropology during WW II. He discusses uses that were legitimate in his view and notes occasions in which anthropological considerations should have been, but were not, taken into account, for example, the decision to drop the atomic bomb. He argues that Truman and Eisenhower didn't understand the Japanese culture and opted instead for an “expedient display of power.” Good anthropology, by Price's definition, does not use cultural knowledge against those from whom it was acquired—fascism excepted.

At times *Anthropological Intelligence* becomes encumbered by the jargon of social science, e.g., “the postmodern commitment to maintaining a stiff incredulity towards metanarratives.” And Price is upset by calls for anthropologists to join the war on terrorism, although he is resigned to the practical need for the American Anthropological Association to accept CIA recruitment ads in its publications. But overall, despite the author's unconcealed biases, the role and value of anthropology in intelligence work is evident. So far, this book is the only one on the subject. Price is working on *Anthropological Intelligence in the Cold War*.

**Arabian Knight: Colonel Bill Eddy USMC and the Rise of American Power in the Middle East**, by Thomas W. Lippman. Vista, CA: Selwa Press, 2008, 317 pp., endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

The son of Protestant missionaries, Bill Eddy was born in Sidon, on the coast of Lebanon. By the time he entered Princeton he spoke Arabic, French, and German. He was a Marine intelligence officer in WW I, saw combat in France, and was left with a lifelong limp from wounds suffered there. In the interwar period, he tried academic life but was ready to reenter the Marines when WW II began. His language skills trumped his limp, and he became the US naval attaché to Egypt. During the war he worked with OSS in the runup to Operation Torch, the British-American invasion of North Africa, and he was the translator for FDR when the president met King Ibn Saud in 1943. After the war Eddy served in the State Department and was its point man with Congress in working out details of the postwar Intelligence Community. The discussion of the evolving CIA-State relationship is particularly good. Eddy eventually retired from State and served ARAMCO in the Middle East until his death in 1962. A well done biography of a fine officer.

**The Black Bats: CIA Spy Flights over China from Taiwan, 1951–1969** by Chris Pocock with Clarence Fu. London: Schiffer, Ltd., 2010, 208 pp., index.

In 1953 the CIA was ordered to cease its flights penetrating PRC airspace. But the missions continued with planes piloted by a US-trained unit of Chinese flyers on Taiwan named the Black Bats, not to be confused with the Black Cats who later flew U-2s. Chris Pocock tells the story of the former in this book. Despite losing 142 crew members, the Black Bats flew photoreconnaissance and SIGINT missions for 20 years using a variety of platforms including B-17s, B-26s, and modified P2Vs. Pocock discusses mission training, CIA administrative support, planning, and execution. In the end the SIGINT missions provided the most valuable intelligence. Overall supervision was provided by the CIA station in Taiwan initially headed by Ray Cline and later Hal Ford. During the Vietnam War, the Bats flew missions over North Vietnam. That program ended in 1973 with the conclusion of the Vietnamese peace talks. The documentation for the book comes largely from the Republic of China archives where co-author historian Clarence Fu did the heavy lifting. Interviews with former participants also contributed. *The Black Bats* is a fitting tribute to some very brave men.

**Cavalier & Roundhead Spies: Intelligence in the Civil War and Commonwealth** by Julian Whitehead. Barnsley, South Yorkshire, Pen & Sword, 2009, 243 pp., endnotes, appendices, photos, index.

In her 1935 history, *Espionage!: The Story of the Secret Service of the English Crown*, M. G. Richings excluded discussion of “the intelligence system under Oliver Cromwell” during the British civil war and after, roughly 1642–1660. *Cavalier & Roundhead Spies* fills that gap by describing the intelligence battles between the Royalist cavaliers, who wanted to regain power, and their republican opponents—the Roundheads—who fought to keep it. Author and former British military intelligence officer Julian Whitehead tells of the intel-

ligence organizations created for the new form of government at the time and the men who led them while protecting the state. Cromwell's principal intelligence officer, John Thurloe, established a precedent-setting small but effective intelligence structure. Whitehead describes it and the espionage techniques employed to counter the never ending assassination plots at home and abroad. These include the recruitment of agents and informers, mail interception, decrypting coded messages, and dealing with defectors. He also stresses the importance of a good relationship between the political leader and his intelligence officer. One of the most important lessons from this period is that intelligence can help in sustaining a government, but it is not likely to maintain a government in power. Remarkably, after Cromwell's commonwealth fell and Charles II was restored to the throne, Thurloe survived, and some of his agents managed to change sides; Harvard-educated George Downing—who survived to name a London street after himself—is a notable example.

*Cavalier & Roundhead Spies* is rich in British historical detail and brings to light the key role of intelligence in government and the historical importance of techniques that are basic practices to this day.

**Deathly Deception: The Real Story of Operation Mincemeat** by Denis Smyth. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010, 367 pp., endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

The story of Operation Mincemeat was first told by Ewen Montagu in his 1954 book, *The Man Who Never Was*. For security reasons only the bare essentials were revealed. In brief, the body of a recently deceased man was used to serve as a fictitious British officer, "Major Martin," who had died in a plane crash off the Spanish coast in April 1943. The dispatch bag fastened to his wrist was recovered by a fisherman and eventually delivered to German intelligence officers, who found in it supposedly top secret documents indicating that the military objective of the upcoming Allied Operation Husky was Greece and not Sicily, as the Germans suspected. The deception, monitored by Ultra, was successful. The Germans repositioned their forces, and the landing in Sicily was almost unopposed.

In 2010, Ben Macintyre published an updated version of the story in his book, *Operation Mincemeat*.<sup>1</sup> Macintyre had discovered an uncensored copy of Montagu's manuscript, and other materials had been released by the British National Archives. Thus, he was able to add names of more participants and details about the planning and execution on both the British and German sides.

What then, might one expect from another book on the subject? Surprisingly, University of Toronto history professor Denis Smyth does present new details. For example, while Montagu didn't even mention that the Germans had

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<sup>1</sup> For a review of Ben Macintyre's *Operation Mincemeat*, see Hayden Peake, "Intelligence Officer's Bookshelf," *Studies in Intelligence* 54 no. 2 (June 2010).

performed an autopsy on “Martin,” Macintyre found that an autopsy had been performed, albeit it a superficial one that failed to reveal the true cause of death—rat poisoning. Smyth confirms this result, adding some technical details and additional comments by pathologists. (202–4) On one point, the construction of the container used to transport “Martin” on his submarine ride to Spain, the Smyth and Macintyre accounts differ sharply. Macintyre credits the design and construction to Charles Fraser-Smith—later said to be the model for Ian Fleming’s “Q” in the James Bond novels. He doesn’t give a source, but Fraser-Smith makes the same claim in his memoir.<sup>1</sup> Smyth’s version credits the Ministry of Aircraft Production and cites a primary source (317, fn 95). Smyth also adds a lengthy and detailed analysis of the German reactions to the planted documents. In an appendix, Smyth discusses a post-war controversy that challenged the true identity of the body used in the deception, a topic Macintyre avoids. On the other hand, Smyth has much less than Macintyre on the subject of Montagu dining out with his secretary in London during the planning of Mincemeat—to the irritation of his wife—probably because he didn’t have access to Montagu’s personal letters as Macintyre did. Finally, Smyth’s bibliography is more extensive than Macintyre’s.

*Deathly Deception* is an important, well-written, and soundly documented history of Operation Mincemeat. For the most complete story, however, Macintyre should also be consulted.

**Dilly: The Man Who Broke Enigma** by Mavis Batey. London: Dialogue, 2009, 244 pp., endnotes, appendices, glossary photos, index.

Alfred Dillwyn (Dilly) Knox was a classical Latin scholar at Oxford who joined the Admiralty’s codebreaking section—Room 40—during WW I and remained a cryptographer for the rest of his life. He moved to the Government Code & Cypher School (GC&CS) after the war, where he began breaking Bolshevik codes and then attacking the multiple variations of new German cipher machine, Enigma. He broke the Italian and Spanish versions of Enigma before WW II, and he worked with the Poles and French to bring their version of Enigma to England just before the war. His most famous accomplishment during the war was the breaking of the Abwehr Enigma, the feat that allowed the Allies to monitor German army plans and operations.

Although a biography of Knox already exists,<sup>2</sup> author Mavis Batey, who worked with Knox at Bletchley Park (BP), is the first to write about his career since secrecy restrictions were lifted. The portrait she creates is one of a brilliant, absent-minded intellectual—he forgot to invite two of his brothers to his wedding—who recruited a group of women—Dilly’s girls—and broke some of the most important Enigma codes of the war. The product they produced was initially called *Illicit Services Knox* but later identified as *Intelligence Services Knox (ISK)*, a designation used within BP but called Ultra elsewhere. The ISK

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<sup>1</sup> *The Secret War of Charles Fraser-Smith*, with Gerald McKnight and Sandy Lesberg (London: M. Joseph, 1981).

<sup>2</sup> Penelope Fitzgerald, *The Knox Brothers* (London: Macmillan, 1977).

decryptions were a key element of the Double Cross Committee's double-agent operations that played an important role in deception operations against the Germans. Kim Philby refers to Knox's breaking of the Abwehr codes in his book *My Silent War*—a disclosure the British Secret Service chose to overlook—six years before the Ultra secret was officially made public by Frederick Winterbotham in his 1974 book, *The Ultra Secret*.

Batey uses lay terms to explain the methods Knox used to accomplish his feats. Some technical details are included in appendices. Knox succumbed to cancer in 1943, but before he did he worked through his illness on his death bed, solving new variations of Enigma. *Dilly* is an important book in the history of cryptography, and it shows how much this critical field is both a human art and a science.

***England's Greatest Spy: Eamon de Valera*** by John J. Turi. London: Stacey International, 2009, 472 pp., end of chapter notes, bibliography, photos, index.

Eamon de Valera, Ireland's iconic founding statesman and first president, led the nation during more than 50 years in opposition to British rule. John Turi, a student of Irish history researching a book on Michael Collins—a contemporary of de Valera—discovered evidence that de Valera was a British spy during most of his career. His thesis is that de Valera used his reputation to mask his espionage service to the British crown while promoting English interests in Ireland and America. Turi argues that what were perceived as monstrous blunders by de Valera were the result of his work for the British. For many Irish historians this attempt to turn Irish history on its head remains unproved. Though the foreword claims that the book provides proof of guilt, Turi himself notes that “the final verdict is up to [the reader]. (xi) The documents that might prove his case remain locked in the British archives. Thus the title claims a bit more than the book proves—cause and effect remain obscure when espionage is considered.

***Hunting Evil: The Nazi War Criminals Who Escaped and the Hunt to Bring Them to Justice***, by Guy Walters. NY: Bantam Books, 2009, 518 pp., end-notes, bibliography, photos, index.

This is a familiar topic: “With the help of the Vatican, an escape network called *Odessa* helped thousands of Nazi war criminals escape prosecution after WW II.” But there are some who have challenged this view, and British journalist Guy Walters decided to determine who was right. His research revealed a mix of fact, embellished truth, and flagrant errors “served up by junk historians.” (1) In short, he found that the *Odessa* network is a myth and that allegations that Pope Pius XII was directly involved in engineering escapes are wrong, though the participation of various priests is well documented. His research also revealed that legendary Nazi hunter Simon Wiesenthal was a self-serving fabricator who also did some good. *Hunting Evil* presents new details of what really happened in instances not previously reported. And, for completeness, he includes familiar cases—for example, Klaus Barbi (Gestapo), and Wilhelm Höttl (SS), who were recruited by US intelligence—and Adolf Eichmann, who is discussed in a separate chapter.

The *Odessa* and Wiesenthal stories are intertwined. Walters shows that the term “Odessa” originated with a Hungarian who claimed it was run by “one Clara Stauffer.” (138) Wiesenthal asserted he heard the term from a former Abwehr officer. He later provided author Frederick Forsyth “with a vast amount of material” for his book *The Odessa File*. (346) Forsyth himself realized there was no evidence of an Odessa network and characterized the reality as “an old boy network, the old school tie.” (347) In his chapter, “The Odessa Myth,” Walters adds considerable detail about the other players involved and the variants of the story that have persisted in both fact and fiction.

With piercing irony, Walters discusses several so-called nonfiction authors—some of the junk historians—who wrote books claiming various Nazis, declared dead, actually survived to continue their work. American author Ladislas Farago, in a series of newspaper articles and his book *Aftermath*, claimed to have met Martin Bormann and learned the details of his escape.<sup>1</sup> (159) Even more sensationally wrong, Walters writes, was the contribution of William Stevenson in his book *The Bormann Brotherhood*.<sup>2</sup> Wiesenthal was part of the Bormann story too, as revealed in his book *The Murderers Among Us*.<sup>3</sup>

*Hunting Evil* draws on primary and secondary sources and interviews with survivors to add substance and perspective to a darkly sordid story that still commands attention. It also makes brutally clear the dilemma faced by intelligence agencies whose potentially valuable agents have less than unimpeachable résumés. This is a fine book containing valuable professional background.

***Iran and the CIA: The Fall of Mosaddeq Revisited*** by Dariush Bayandor. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, 247 pp., endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

The 27-month-long government of Prime Minister Muhammad Mosaddeq succumbed to a coup d'état in Iran on 19 August 1953. Most historians and participants writing about the event have attributed the coup to a conspiracy engineered by CIA and British intelligence services.<sup>4</sup> In recent years, however, alternative explanations have emerged. In 2004, Professor Mark Gasiorowski, while acknowledging the US and UK roles, concluded that a wide variety of Iranians made crucial contributions, to bringing about Mosaddeq's overthrow.<sup>5</sup> In 2008, Professor Fariborz Mokhtari suggested that the “political turmoil” that led to the coup resulted from “internal dynamics more potent than any foreign influence...the same political forces that brought Mossadeq to power brought him

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<sup>1</sup> *Aftermath: Martin Bormann and the Fourth Reich* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974).

<sup>2</sup> *The Bormann Brotherhood* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1973). Stevenson would later write another quasifictional work, *The Man Called Intrepid*. (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976).

<sup>3</sup> *The Murderers Among Us: The Simon Wiesenthal Memoirs* (New York: Bantam Books (1973).

<sup>4</sup> See for example, Kermit Roosevelt, *Countercoup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1979) and Stephen Kinzer, *All The Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror* (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2003)

<sup>5</sup> Mark Gasiorowski, “Why Did Mosaddeq Fall?” in *Mohammed Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran*, edited by Mark Gasiorowski and Malcom Byrne, (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2004), 262–80.

down.”<sup>1</sup> A recent op-ed piece in the *Washington Post* noted that “the CIA’s role in Mossadeq’s demise was largely inconsequential.”<sup>2</sup>

In his book *Iran and the CIA*, Darioush Bayandor—a historian who served as a diplomat for the government of the shah of Iran—goes even further. He makes four main arguments. First, the coup planned by US and British intelligence for 15–16 August failed. Second, “no organic link [can] be established between the failed CIA-MI6 plot to oust Mosaddeq in mid-August and his actual downfall on 19 August 1953.” (155–6) Third, “a nucleus of revolt among the line officers in the Tehran garrison already existed before CIA/SIS developed their plan.” (171); Finally, the actual overthrow was due to a confluence of these “disgruntled officers and crowds of diverse profiles” ignited by the actions of Islamic clerics—whom he names—fearful of a secular republic. They were supported by government troops that refused to put down the demonstrations. (173) Bayandor does acknowledge that the failure of the CIA plan codenamed TPAJAX “set off a chain reaction which led to the...Mosaddeq downfall,” but its role, he argues, was indirect—success by default. (175)

These judgments are based mainly on recently released government files—Iranian, US, and UK—interviews with participants, and a CIA history leaked to the *New York Times*. Bayandor takes care to identify the key Iranian political, military, and religious players, while probing the shifting allegiances that link them and their contacts with the CIA/SIS officers. He also analyzes the literature on the subject, paying special attention to Kermit Roosevelt, the CIA officer most directly involved. Roosevelt’s book, he concludes, borders on “prevarication,” (155) for claiming the CIA was the prime mover behind the coup on 19 August.

Has Professor Bayandor got it right? Would the coup have occurred without any CIA/MI6 involvement? An affirmative answer to the first question, aside from embarrassing a number of historians and upsetting CIA officers involved who were not interviewed, would undercut the current Iranian government’s persistent allegations that the coup was an imperial adventure that led to years of repression until salvaged by the revolution. *Iran and the CIA* implies the answer to the second question is yes, “eventually,” thus leaving the door open for further studies as to which side really knew what the other was doing. Attributing cause and effect is a persistent intelligence problem.

***Shadows on the Mountains: The Allies, the Resistance, and the Rivalries that Doomed WW II Yugoslavia*** by Marcia Christoff Kurapovna. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2010, 320 pp., endnotes, photos, index.

In the lobby of the CIA’s Original Headquarters Building is a memorial to OSS officers lost during WW II. It consists of a single star on the marble wall and a book that lists the names of the 116 fallen.<sup>3</sup> In the middle of the list is

<sup>1</sup> Fariborz Mokhtari, “Iran’s 1953 Coup Revisited, Internal Dynamics versus External Intrigue,” *The Middle East Journal* 62 no. 3 (Summer 2008): 457–86.

<sup>2</sup> Ray Takeyh, “Who Killed Iran’s Democracy,” *Washington Post*, 18 August 2010.

<sup>3</sup> See <https://www.cia.gov/about-cia/virtual-tour/virtual-tour-flash/index.html>.

the name of Major Linn M. Farish, who died in an airplane crash in 1944. His story opens Marcia Kurapovna's book. Anxious to get into the European war, Farrish, a Stanford University-educated engineer, volunteered with the British army in Canada. He transferred to OSS in 1943 and joined a British Special Operations Executive (SOE) unit in Yugoslavia. He was charged with finding landing fields and helping downed airmen escape the Balkans. His ability to work well with the locals at all levels earned him the nickname "Lawrence of Yugoslavia" among his Allied colleagues.

The struggle to rescue and deliver airmen to safety while supporting the Yugoslav resistance forms one thread of the story told in *Shadows on the Mountains*. The other thread is a description of the complex political situation within which the Allies had to function as pro-democracy Chetniks and Tito-led communist Partisans fought each other as much as they fought Germans. Both accepted Allied logistical support—in fact, the Partisans demanded it. But they didn't trust the British or the Americans. They saw in Lawrence of Yugoslavia "not an idealistic hero but the perfidious, arrogant champion of an empire." (85) The situation was complicated even more by two events. First, Churchill announced British backing for the Partisans—thought to be killing more Germans than the Chetniks—and the ending of all support to the Chetniks. Then the Allies rejected a German offer to surrender in Yugoslavia, an action that resulted in increased Soviet suspicion and recriminations. (254ff) Kurapovna explains how, in the midst of these tensions, Chetnik leader Draza Mihailovic continued battling the Nazis and the Partisans and still helped more than 500 downed fliers to safety as part of Operation Halyard.

*Shadows on the Mountains* ends with the story of Tito's postwar takeover in Yugoslavia and the trial and execution of Mihailovic. Cries for intervention by those he had rescued were ignored by the US government to placate Tito. In the epilogue Kurapovna recounts how attempts to vindicate Mihailovic's role were finally realized. In the end, she writes, "the American airmen and Chetniks had triumphed." (271)

**T-Force: The Race for Nazi War Secrets, 1945** by Sean Longden. London: Constable, 2009, 379 pp., endnote, bibliography, photos, index.

In early 1945, the various Allied commands each formed teams to follow the invasion troops in Europe and capture enemy men and materials associated with the advanced weapons the Germans were known to be developing. While there was a level of cooperation in some areas, the British formed a secret independent team that was given specific targets to acquire before the Russian and Americans could do so. It was called T-Force.

Little has been written about the exploits of T-Force because what records remained were only recently declassified. Military historian Sean Longden first learned about the unit while interviewing some of its former members in connection with another book. When he realized the T-Force story needed to be told, the veterans helped him interpret the sometimes incomplete records.

There was precedent for T-Force. Early in the war Ian Fleming had formed a special-forces-type unit called 30 Assault Unit (30AU) whose job it was to obtain records and documents during raids on enemy headquarters, mainly after land battles. Longden learned that Fleming played a role in the formation of T-Force too and later was on the committee that selected its targets.

Since T-Force was formed near the end of the war, it drew personnel from the “waifs and strays” at replacement depots. Some had landed at Normandy, others were members of the landing craft crews that put them ashore, and others had been ambulance drivers and merchant mariners. There were also civilian volunteers, scientist, and secretaries. T-Force gradually grew in size to 5,000, commanded by a brigadier who made them a proud, elite group.

The book tells how the force captured German nuclear scientists and their records, secured rocket research reports, found V-2 rockets, infrared cameras, U-boat designs, and chemical weapons materials. The unit even exceeded its brief in May 1945 by occupying the naval research facility at Kiel ahead of General Montgomery’s advancing army, accepting the surrender of 40,000 Germans, and freeing 420,000 slave laborers. At Kiel it found submarines under construction and two German heavy cruisers, the *Admiral Hipper* and the *Prinz Eugen*. Another T-Force element found “three lorry loads of Krupps documentation hidden in a colliery” (233) and liberated them before the Russians got there.

There were several instances in which T-Force elements helped German civilians escape oncoming Russians, though that was not part of their official mission. By 1947, T-Force recoveries had reached a point of diminishing returns, and the operation was terminated in June of that year. Longden concludes with a chapter on the legacy of T-Force, recognizing its contribution to the advancement of warfare by acquiring the secrets of German weapons science. *T-Force*, the book, gives long overdue recognition to a secret technical intelligence unit and its contribution to the history of WW II.

***The World that Never Was: A True Story of Dreamers, Schemers, Anarchists, and Secret Agents*** by Alex Butterworth. New York: Pantheon Books, 2010, 482 pp., notes on sources, bibliography, photos, index.

The primary title refers to 19th and early 20th century anarchists and revolutionaries who employed assassinations, bombings, and coup attempts in efforts to achieve a utopian world without government. Alex Butterworth’s central thesis is that there is much to be learned from this early “war on terrorism” that applies to the parallel world that exists today. To support his argument, he provides examples of assassins, bombers, agent provocateurs, and radical groups that existed from at least the Paris Commune (1871) until the mid-1930s. He also shows that some government agencies played a role, for example, the Russian Czarist Okhrana—he never mentions the American Bureau of Investigation and the Palmer raids—that worked tirelessly to penetrate and eliminate these groups and individuals.

The book is weak on several levels. First, there is nothing new in the stories he tells. The repressive actions of the secret agents of Okhrana, for example, are well documented elsewhere. And that raises a second weakness. There are no source citations, only general references for each chapter. The third and most troubling weakness is his failure actually to draw any lessons from the mass of detail he provides. He merely notes that the bombings, assassinations, and conspiracies described failed to achieve their overall goals. Any lessons as to why and what might be done today are left to the reader's imagination. In short, unless one wants a rambling, often disjointed, summary of the nascent radical anarchist and communist movements, readers should pass this one by.

### ***Intelligence Abroad***

***The Entity: Five Centuries of Secret Vatican Espionage*** by Eric Frattini.  
New York: St. Martin's Press, 2008, 431 pp., endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

Vatican espionage has already been the subject of three books in the 21st century. Historian David Alvarez's *Spies in the Vatican: Espionage & Intrigue from Napoleon to the Holocaust* (2002) revealed papal secret service operations from the early 19th century to the end of WW II; Journalist John Koe-hler's work, *Spies in the Vatican: The Soviet Union's Cold War Against the Catholic Church*, concentrated on KGB penetration of the priesthood from the early 20th century until the present.<sup>1</sup> The latest contribution, by Italian author Eric Frattini, takes a wider scope than its predecessors by examining Vatican espionage and security practices around the world from the 16th century to the present. He identifies two papal intelligence institutions: the counterespionage and security service called *Sodalitium Pianum* (formally named in 1913) and the foreign intelligence service called the Holy Alliance (origin unknown, renamed the Entity in 1930). The Holy See (the central institution of the church) denies that either exists. The Vatican archives and other reliable sources cited in all three books suggest otherwise.

*The Entity* describes the origins of the Holy Alliance and how it used the Jesuits to implement plots against foreign sovereigns, Elizabeth I being a famous example. Frattini explains how the Vatican's agents assassinated William of Orange (1584) and spied on a Chinese order of missionaries thought to be deviating from papal policy. The Holy Alliance was dissolved when Napoleon occupied the papal palace and exiled the pope, but members of the institution managed to carry files to safety. They were returned to Rome, along with the pope, after the Battle of Waterloo. The *Sodalitium Pianum* exposed a German priest-agent who had penetrated the Vatican during WW I, breaking his codes in the process. It was one of several such operations during the period. Frattini also covers Vatican espionage against the Germans during

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<sup>1</sup> *Spies in the Vatican: Espionage & Intrigue from Napoleon to the Holocaust* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002); *Spies in the Vatican: The Soviet Union's Cold War Against the Catholic Church* (New York: Pegasus Books, 2009).

WW II and the various priests—but not the pope—who helped Nazis flee Europe after the war. Operations during the Cold War include a banking scandal and support of CIA agent Ryszard Kuklinski's escape from Poland. Frattini addresses the investigation of the attempted assassination of Pope John Paul II and the curious “pontifical order” to suspend all investigations into the case; he reports on the sealing of the files in the Vatican archives but does not analyze the event. (332ff) The Vatican's position on the assassin's sponsor has never been made public, and Frattini doesn't speculate.

The final chapter deals with the death of Pope John Paul II and the role of the Vatican's intelligence services in the election of the new pope, which included a sweep of the Sistine Chapel for concealed listening devices. A year after the new pope was elected, he used his security services to deal with a revelation that more than 30 priests had been long time agents of the Cold War Polish intelligence service, the SB and its parent, the KGB.

*The Entity*, based on a variety of sources, many unnamed, presents a fascinating history. What it doesn't do is explain how the intelligence services recruit and train its members, and if the Entity has its way no book ever will.

***The Family File*** by Mark Aarons. (Melbourne, Australia: Black, Inc., 2010), 346 pp., glossary, photos, index.

The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), which strives to preserve domestic security, functions much like Britain's MI5. For most of the 20th century ASIO and its predecessor organizations had two principal targets. The first was the Communist Party of Australia (CPA), whose members were considered subversives “committed to the overthrow of the constitutional order.” (xii) *The Family File* reveals that for five decades four generations of the Aarons family—including the author—was the prototypical example the ASIO's communist target. Throughout this time, the family was subjected to intense security surveillance because it “proudly espoused the cause of revolutionary change to replace Australia's political, social, and economic system with one based on the communist ideal.” (x-xi) The second target was the Soviet intelligence service and the Australians it recruited to work as agents in the Australian government and overseas. Not surprisingly, these two sets of targets were operationally entangled.

*The Family File* is based on recently declassified documents, more than 14,000 pages just on Laurie Aarons—the author's father—who eventually became the general secretary of the CPA. The files reveal “a powerful and basically accurate” account of Aarons family activities and the Australian left under intense surveillance. (xii) The files also show that the family, while active in the party, shunned KGB attempts to involve them *directly* in espionage. As Laurie Aarons later put it when he refused attempts by a KGB officer—later expelled from the country—to help with recruitments, “spying is a very damaging thing to have alleged against you.” (170)

A sub-theme of the book is the many espionage cases that surfaced in the report of the Royal Commission on Espionage issued in 1955 after the uproar

following the defection of KGB officers Vladimir Petrov and his wife. The most important revelation, detailed in this book for the first time, involved Wally Clayton, the Soviet spymaster in Australia who had served as an agent since 1942. Clayton was exposed by Venona but that evidence couldn't be used in court or before the commission. Clayton was questioned by the commission but he was evasive. Nevertheless, several of his agents were identified, for example Ian Milner, an External Affairs officer who had defected to Czechoslovakia in 1950.

But all this is not to say Laurie Aarons was unsympathetic to CPA members who did serve as KGB agents; he described Wally Clayton as "a terrific comrade." (171). Although the ASIO suspected that Laurie had assumed Clayton's role as spymaster, in fact Aarons shut down Clayton's illegal apparatus.

*The Family File* tells how genuine dedication to the communist cause evolved into disillusionment with its communist dream. The final irony, Laurie admitted, was that he only achieved financial security on a capitalist government pension. There are strong parallels with the communist attempts to subvert the Australian government and the approach used against other Western nations, with about the same degree of success. There really was a worldwide communist threat.

***Military Intelligence in Cyprus: From the Great War to the Middle East Crises*** by Panagiotis Dimitrakis. New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2010, 223 pp., endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

For more than 3,000 years, the strategic location of the isle of Cyprus made it the target of conquests by Greeks, Persians, Romans, and Turks. In 1878, the British, with a view toward protecting their interests in the Suez Canal, signed an agreement with Turkey that allowed Britain to occupy and administer the island. The importance of Cyprus increased in 1888, when the canal was placed under British protection, and island became part of the British Empire in 1914. After a brief summary of Cyprus's role during WW I, when it served as a staging area and the location for intelligence and communications units, Panagiotis Dimitrakis, a British-educated Greek historian, reviews the island's military intelligence role and its many controversial players after it became a crown colony in 1925.

Dimitrakis explains that early in WW II, under constant German threat, Cyprus was spared German occupation in part because of a successful British deception operation and in part because of SOE covert operations. These depended on Cypriot informers who also kept tabs on the Greek, Cypriot, and communist factions then seeking power.

After WW II, the British negotiated a military base and intelligence agreement with the Greeks, who were pressing for independence but were hobbled by their civil war. In 1955, the British were surprised by a Greek revolt that their spies failed to detect. (76ff) A long insurgency followed, ending in 1960 with the creation of the Sovereign State of the Republic of Cyprus. (104) Dim-

itrikis provides a vivid account of how the British managed to retain their bases and communications units.

Dimitrakis also presents a detailed description of the events before and after the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus. By then the island was a base for U-2s as well as British agents and COMINT sites that had to be protected. Although a cease-fire was quickly reached, the Cypriot government was soon the victim of a sequence of terrorist attacks following the 1979 Iranian revolution. This resulted in the strengthening of British and US bases. By the mid-1990s, Dimitrakis concludes, "Cyprus was deemed the most militarized island in the world." But by 2007, the situation had calmed and Cyprus became a member of the Euro-zone. Throughout these years of turmoil, however, its intelligence role has functioned well.

*Military Intelligence in Cyprus* is a scholarly reference work based mainly on primary sources and is not light reading. But it is a sound history of a topic not covered elsewhere and thus a most welcome and valuable contribution to the literature.

***Mossad Exodus: The Daring Undercover Rescue of the Lost Jewish Tribe***  
by Gad Shimron. (Jerusalem: Gefen Publishing House, 2007), 231 pp., photos, no index.

In his book, *The Main Enemy*, former CIA officer Milton Bearden mentions that in 1985 he helped shepherd Ethiopian Falasha Jews on their "long trek to Israel and then protected a team of Mossad agents on the run in Khartoum."<sup>1</sup> Author Gad Shimron was one of those agents. *Mossad Exodus* is his story.

The Falasha, or Beta Israel Jews, had lived for generations in a less-than-friendly Ethiopia. Only a few had been allowed to emigrate to Israel, though many had made their way to Sudan. Early in the 1980s, Prime Minister Menachem Begin approved what became known as Operation Moses, a plan to covertly exfiltrate those who had escaped to Sudan. Shimron arrived in Sudan under European cover in 1981 to make arrangements. He describes the recruitment of support agents, the use of cover businesses, the acquisition of vehicles—a major undertaking—and the establishment of the cover company, Arous Holiday Village, nominally a resort for Europeans. Despite horrendous living and logistical conditions early in the operation, secret exfiltrations of small groups by sea soon began. When these were discovered, exfiltration by air was implemented with the cooperation of the Sudanese government. When the government was overthrown, secret flights, arranged by the CIA, continued. Shimron's participation in the operation ended in 1985, but in the concluding chapters he describes continuing efforts, with the cooperation of the Ethiopian government, well into the 21st century. More than 2 million Falashas have made it to Israel.

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<sup>1</sup> Milton Bearden and James Risen, *The Main Enemy: The Inside Story of the CIA's Final Showdown with the KGB* (NY: Ballantine Books, 2004), 62.

*Mossad Exodus* is an exciting story that describes field expedient tradecraft conducted by a few officers working under difficult nonofficial cover conditions. It is told with a sense of humor and is a tribute to all involved.

**Fiction**

**The Caliphate** by Andre Le Gallo. New York: Dorchester Publishing, 2010, 362 pp.

The author is a retired CIA case officer who served in the Middle East. He draws on considerable experience to craft this, his first novel. The protagonist, Steve Church, is the son of a retired CIA officer, whose career choice Steve did not plan to follow. But when he becomes involuntarily involved in a plot of a group of Islamic fundamentalists determined to achieve a caliphate by violent elimination of infidels, Steve rises to the occasion. The leader of the terrorist group happens to be Steve's eccentric college classmate, and Steve turns to the work of defeating him. Steve cooperates with the CIA and Mossad—a surprise or two here—to penetrate the terrorists and prevent an act of nuclear terrorism. There is a woman in the mix, and her role is cleverly integrated into the operation. The tradecraft is realistic, as is the brutal treatment of terrorist traitors, and the plausible plot. A good if sometimes frightening read.



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## **Books Reviewed in *Studies in Intelligence* 2010**

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### **Current Topics and Issues**

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*Beyond Repair: The Decline and Fall of the CIA* by Charles S. Faddis (54 1 [March], Bookshelf)

*Cyber War: The Next Threat to National Security and What To Do About It* by Richard A. Clarke and Robert K. Knake (54 4 [December], Bookshelf)

*Ethics of Spying: A Reader for the Intelligence Professional*, Volume 2 by Jan Goldman (ed.) (54 2 [June], Bookshelf)

*Historical Dictionary of Terrorism* by Sean K. Anderson with Stephen Sloan (54 2 [June], Bookshelf)

*Intelligence and Human Rights in the Era of Global Terrorism* by Steve Tsang (ed.) (54 4 [December], Bookshelf)

*Intelligence and National Security Policymaking on Iraq: British and American Perspectives* by James P. Pfiffner and Mark Phythian, (eds.) (54 1 [March], Bookshelf)

*Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy* by Mark M. Lowenthal (54 1 [March], Bookshelf)

*Intelligence Issues and Developments* by Terrance M. Paulson (ed.) (54 4 [December], Bookshelf)

*The Intelligence Wars: Lessons from Baghdad* by Steven K. O'Hern (54 4 [December], Bookshelf)

*Islamic Radicalism and Global Jihad* by Devin R. Springer, James L. Regens, and David N. Edger (54 1 [March], Bookshelf)

*Necessary Secrets: National Security, the Media, and the Rule of Law* by Gabriel Schoenfeld (54 3 [September], Bookshelf)

*The Nuclear Express: A Political History of the Bomb and Its Proliferation* by Thomas C. Reed and Danny B. Stillman (54 1 [March], Bookshelf)

*Peddling Peril: How the Secret Nuclear Trade Arms America's Enemies* by David Albright (54 4 [December], Bookshelf)

*Preventing Catastrophe: The Use and Misuse of Intelligence in Efforts to Halt the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction* by Thomas Graham Jr. and Keith A. Hansen (54 1 [March], Bookshelf)

*The Search for Al Qaeda: Its Leadership, Ideology, and Future* by Bruce Riedel (54 2 [June], Bookshelf)

*Securing the City: Inside America's Best Counter-terror Force-The NYPD* by Christopher Dickey. (54 2 [June], Stephen J. Garber)

*Spinning Intelligence: Why Intelligence Needs the Media, Why the Media Needs Intelligence* by Robert Dover and Michael S. Goodman (eds.) (54 1 [March], Mark Mansfield)

*A Time to Betray: The Astonishing Double Life of a CIA Agent Inside the Revolutionary Guards of Iran* by Reza Kahlili (54 3 [September], Bookshelf)

*The Watchers: The Rise of America's Surveillance State* by Shane Harris (54 3 [September], Bookshelf)

*A World Of Trouble: The White House and the Middle East-From the Cold War to the War on Terror* by Patrick Tyler (54 4 [December], Bookshelf)

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Following book titles and author names are the *Studies in Intelligence* issue in which the review appeared and the name of the reviewer. All Bookshelf reviews are by Hayden Peake.

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## General Intelligence

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*Handbook of Scientific Methods of Inquiry for Intelligence Analysis* by Hank Prunckum (54 4 [December], Bookshelf)

*Handbook of Warning Intelligence: Assessing the Threat to National Security* by Cynthia Grabo (54 4 [December], Bookshelf)

*Historical Dictionary of Naval Intelligence* by Nigel West (54 3 [September], Bookshelf)

*Intelligence Analysis: A Target-Centric Approach, 3rd Edition* by Robert M. Clark (54 4 [December], Bookshelf)

*Intelligence Analysis: How To Think In Complex Environments* by Wayne Michael Hall and Gary Citrenbaum (54 4 [December], Bookshelf)

*Intelligence Research and Analysis: An Introduction* by Jerome Clauser (54 4 [December], Bookshelf)

*The International Politics of Intelligence Sharing* by James Igoe Walsh (54 4 [December], J.B. Webb)

*National Intelligence Systems: Current Research and Future Prospects* by Gregory F. Treverton and Wilhelm Agrell (eds.) (54 4 [December], Bookshelf)

*The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence* by Loch Johnson (ed.) (54 3 [September], Bookshelf)

*Structured Analytical Techniques for Intelligence Analysis* by Richards J. Heuer, Jr. and Randolph H. Pherson (54 3 [September], Bookshelf)

## Historical

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*Anthropological Intelligence: The Deployment and Neglect of American Anthropology in the Second World War* by David H. Price (54 4 [December], Bookshelf)

*Arabian Knight: Colonel Bill Eddy USMC and the Rise of American Power in the Middle East* by Thomas W. Lippman (54 4 [December], Bookshelf)

*The Black Bats: CIA Spy Flights over China from Taiwan, 1951-1969* by Chris Pocock, and Clarence Fu (54 4 [December], Bookshelf)

*Cash On Delivery: CIA Special Operations during the Secret War in Laos* by Thomas Leo Briggs (54 2 [June], Bookshelf)

*Cavalier & Roundhead Spies: Intelligence in the Civil War and Commonwealth* by Julian Whitehead (54 4 [December], Bookshelf)

*The Chief Culprit: Stalin's Grand Design to Start World War II* by Viktor Suvorov (54 3 [September], Bookshelf)

*Cold War Radio: The Dangerous History of American Broadcasting in Europe, 1950-1989* by Richard H. Cummings (54 2 [June], Bookshelf)

*Covert Action in the Cold War: US Policy, Intelligence, and CIA Operations* by James Callanan (54 2 [June], Bookshelf)

*Deathly Deception: The Real Story of Operation Mincemeat* by Denis Smyth (54 4 [December], Bookshelf)

*The Deceivers: Allied Military Deception in the Second World War* by Thaddeus Holt (54 3 [September], Bookshelf)

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## Historical (continued)

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